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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FAST-FOOD FRANCHISING 
CONTRACTS: TOWARDS A NEW “INTERMEDIARY” 
THEORY OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT 
Kati L. Griffith* 
Abstract: The “Fight for Fifteen and a Union” movement among fast-food workers and 
their allies has raised awareness about wage inequality in the United States. Rather than 
negotiating for better wages and working conditions with economically weak restaurant-level 
franchisees, the movement aims to affect the practices of what they view as the all-powerful 
brands—the franchisors. Few would dispute the notion that the franchisor brands, not their 
franchisees, set industry-wide standards and, thus, have the ability to offset rising wage 
inequality and improve working conditions. And yet, the movement has raised controversial 
law and policy questions about the legal responsibilities of these fast-food Goliaths under 
current labor and employment laws. Should fast-food brands, as franchisors, be legally 
responsible as “employers” for the wage-and-hour violations suffered by the individuals who 
serve us fast food in their franchised stores, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)? 
Do they have a legal obligation, under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), to bargain 
with the labor unions representing fast-food workers in their franchised stores? This Article 
addresses these timely questions with original empirical research of forty-four contracts 
between top fifty fast-food franchisors and their franchisees in 2016. The contractual analysis 
reveals a new theory of joint employment via franchisor influence over franchisees’ managers. 
Unlike prior foci on franchisor-franchisee relations, and franchisor-crew member relations, this 
Article brings a new party to light: franchisees’ supervisorial managers. Jurisprudential 
analogy to the agricultural context, and case law regarding farm labor contractors as grower 
intermediaries, supports this proposed analytical lens. In sum, the theory developed from this 
rare dataset postulates why some of the Goliaths of fast food may indeed be “employers” with 
legal obligations to the workers in their franchised restaurants. Thus, courts, administrative 
agencies and legislators should be mindful of franchisor influence through intermediaries, as 
well as the complex relationships embedded in the franchise system that make disaggregating 
direct from indirect forms of influence difficult to impossible. 
                                                     
* Associate Professor of Labor & Employment Law, Cornell ILR School & Associate Member of the 
Faculty, Cornell Law School. All errors and omissions are my own. I would like to thank Caro Achar, 
Deandra Fike, Michael Iadevaia, Christopher Ioannou, Seth Lutsic, Zane Mokhiber, Steven Saltz, 
Olivia St. Amand and Gideon Teitel for their excellent assistance and Aliqae Geraci, the Assistant 
Director of Catherwood Research Services, for skillfully facilitating research assistance. Special 
appreciation goes out to Michelle Lee—an extremely talented, now graduated, Cornell Law student 
who painstakingly helped me find, access, organize and analyze these contracts over multiple years. 
I would like to thank Andrew Elmore, Samuel Estreicher, Leslie Gates, Michael Iadevaia, Patricia 
Kakalec, Patrick Oakford and Mark Pedulla for their observations and questions as I worked through 
the theory, and the Worker Institute at Cornell for supporting this research stream. The author would 
like to acknowledge and appreciate the Russell Sage Foundation for funding the research assistance 
for this project and my colleagues Rose Batt, Lance Compa, Michael Harper, Tashlin Lakhani, Can 
Ouyang, Wilma Liebman and Tony Royle, for all of their insightful comments and questions over the 
last four years. A final thanks goes out to Allexia Arnold, Sandra Patlan, and the editors of Washington 
Law Review for their careful assistance during the editing process.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3363841 
08 - Griffith.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  8:36 PM 
172 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:171 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 172 
I.  EXISTING JOINT EMPLOYER THEORIES .................. 175 
A. A FLSA Primer for the Franchising Context ............. 175 
B. Franchisor’s Influence over Franchisee’s Front-Line 
Workers ...................................................................... 179 
C. Franchisor’s Influence over Franchisee ...................... 180 
II.  CONTRACTS AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL ................ 183 
III.  PROPOSED THEORY: FRANCHISOR’S INFLUENCE 
OVER FRANCHISEE’S MANAGERS ............................ 186 
A. Contract Data on Managers ........................................ 187 
1. A Comparatively Higher Level of Franchisor 
Influence ............................................................... 187 
2. Franchisor’s Influence over Hiring/Firing of 
Managers .............................................................. 188 
3. Franchisor’s Influence over Job Mobility of 
Managers .............................................................. 191 
4. Franchisor’s Influence over Staffing/Scheduling 
of Managers .......................................................... 193 
5. Franchisor’s Influence over Training of 
Managers .............................................................. 195 
6. Franchisor’s Influence over Managers: The 
Questions Raised .................................................. 198 
B. Agricultural Analogy: Grower’s Influence over 
Contractor Intermediaries ........................................... 200 
IV.  JOINT EMPLOYMENT MOVING FORWARD ............. 203 
A. Probe Managers’ Intermediary Role .......................... 203 
B. Apply the Intermediary Theory to Franchisees Too ... 205 
C. Move Away from Direct Versus Indirect Dichotomy 210 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 214 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The “Fight for Fifteen and a Union” movement among fast-food 
workers and their allies has raised awareness about wage inequality in the 
United States. Indeed, the 2014 poverty rate for restaurant workers was a 
whopping 16.7%, in contrast to a 6.3% poverty rate in other occupations.1 
                                                     
1. HEIDI SHIERHOLZ, ECON. POLICY INST., LOW WAGES AND FEW BENEFITS MEAN MANY 
RESTAURANT WORKERS CAN’T MAKE ENDS MEET 3 (2014). Wage levels for fast food workers are 
lower than other occupations. See Rosemary Batt, Tashlin Lakhani, Jae Eun Lee & Can Ouyang, The 
Quality of Jobs in Restaurants, in GOOD COMPANIES, GOOD JOBS (Paul Osterman ed., forthcoming 
2019) (referring to the low wages of restaurant workers and stating “[t]hey make less than laundry 
and dry cleaning workers, vehicle cleaners, packers and packagers, personal care aides, and non-farm 
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Rather than negotiating for better wages and working conditions with 
economically weak restaurant-level franchisees, the movement aims to 
affect the practices of what it views as the all-powerful brands—the 
franchisors.2 
From the perspective of these workers and their advocates, the Goliaths 
of the fast-food industry are the franchisors, not the franchisees. To many, 
the assessment of who holds the power in this industry is not controversial 
as an economic matter. Few would dispute the notion that the franchisor 
brands, not their franchisees, set industry-wide standards. Thus, brands 
have a superior ability to offset rising wage inequality and to improve 
working conditions in the fast-food industry.3 
And yet, the movement has raised controversial law and policy 
questions about the legal responsibilities of these fast-food Goliaths under 
current labor and employment laws in the United States. Should fast-food 
brands, as franchisors, be legally responsible as “employers” for the wage-
and-hour violations suffered by the individuals who serve us fast food in 
their franchised stores, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)? 
Do they have a legal obligation, under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), to bargain with the labor unions representing fast-food workers 
in their franchised stores? 
This Article addresses these timely questions with original empirical 
research of forty-four contracts between the top fifty fast-food franchisors 
and their franchisees in 2016.4 It uses a comprehensive review of these 
contracts, along with jurisprudential analogies to the agricultural context, 
to support a new theory explaining why some of the Goliaths of fast food 
may indeed be “employers” for the purposes of the FLSA and the NLRA. 
Existing theories direct their attention to a franchisor’s relations with its 
franchisee, or with the franchisee’s front-line workers. In contrast, the 
proposed theory redirects attention to franchisor relations with an often-
overlooked party: the franchisees’ supervisorial managers. These 
managers oversee wages and working conditions of front-line fast food 
workers on a daily basis. The theory proposes that some franchisors may 
exert considerable influence over the managers at their franchised stores, 
who in turn influence front-line workers. In this way, franchisee managers 
may serve as intermediaries between franchisors and front-line workers 
                                                     
animal caretakers”); JOHN SCHMITT & JANELLE JONES, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, SLOW 
PROGRESS FOR FAST-FOOD WORKERS (2013). 
2. For an introduction to business format franchising, see generally JEFFREY L. BRADACH, 
FRANCHISE ORGANIZATIONS (1998). 
3. See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO 
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014). 
4. For a description of the methodology, see infra Part III. 
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such that, in some cases, franchisors are joint employers (along with the 
franchisee) of front-line workers. 
This new “intermediary” theory of joint employment adds analytical 
rigor to joint-employment determinations in the franchising context. It 
also shifts the discussion away from the current spotlight on the need to 
disaggregate direct from indirect forms of influence. Instead, it 
encourages us to consider franchisor influence over supervisorial 
managers, be it direct or indirect. In recent years, legislators, executive 
branch agencies,5 and courts6 have consistently emphasized the direct 
versus indirect framing of joint employment. For instance, the proposed 
Save Local Business Act7 aims to limit wage-and-hour law liability under 
the FLSA, and collective bargaining obligations under the NLRA, solely 
to entities who exercise “direct and immediate,” rather than indirect, 
forms of influence.8 One of the goals of the proposed Act, as its name 
connotes, is to protect the viability of the franchising business model.9 
The Article challenges the implied assumption of this debate that 
decision-makers can consistently disaggregate direct forms of influence 
from indirect forms. Whether intermediary managerial influence 
represents direct or indirect influence is sometimes a difficult analytical 
distinction to make, even if only “direct” forms of influence are relevant 
in joint employer cases moving forward. 
                                                     
5. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which enforces employee rights around union and 
collective activity, proposed a rule to significantly limit the scope of employment relationships. See 
Hassan A. Kanu, Trump Administration Moves to Limit Franchisor Labor Liability, BNA NEWS 
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.bna.com/labor-board-files-n73014482514/# [https://perma.cc/2N7U-
SRX8] (“[T]he NLRB said in the notice. . . . [A]n employer must possess and actually exercise 
substantial direct and immediate control over the essential terms and conditions of employment of 
another employer’s employees in a manner that is not limited and routine.”). The fate of the rule is 
challenged by a recent D.C. Circuit decision. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 
F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (reversing in part, affirming in part, and remanding the NLRB decision). 
6. For more on direct versus indirect distinction in existing jurisprudence, see infra Section IV.C, 
which calls for a move away from the direct versus indirect dichotomy. 
7. H.R. 3441, 115th Cong. (2017). 
8. Id. § 2(a)(B) (stating that a joint employer is a person who “directly, actually, and immediately, 
and not in a limited and routine manner, exercises significant control over essential terms and 
conditions of employment, such as hiring employees, discharging employees, determining individual 
employee rates of pay and benefits, day-to-day supervision of employees, assigning individual work 
schedules, positions, and tasks, or administering employee discipline”). 
9. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, 115TH CONG., FACT SHEET: SAVE LOCAL 
BUSINESS ACT (2017); John T. Bender, Barking Up the Wrong Tree: The NLRB’s Joint-Employer 
Standard and the Case for Preserving the Formalities of Business Format Franchising, 35 
FRANCHISE L.J. 209, 211 (2015); David J. Kaufmann, Felicia N. Soler, Breton H. Permesly & Dale 
A. Cohen, A Franchisor Is Not the Employer of Its Franchisees or Their Employees, 34 FRANCHISE 
L.J. 439, 441 (2015) (“Or [franchisors] may cease franchising altogether (and perhaps, under the 
judicial doctrine of ‘frustration of contractual purpose,’ seek to terminate all existing franchise 
agreements and purchase their franchisees’ assets, resulting in pure company-owned networks).”). 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I highlights that existing joint-
employer analyses tend to examine two mechanisms of influence: the 
relationship between (1) the franchisor and the franchisee’s front-line 
employees and/or (2) the franchisor and the franchisee. This Part reveals 
that the dominant joint-employer theories have not yet considered the 
potential intermediary role of franchisees’ supervisorial managers. Part I 
closely examines franchising joint-employer case law, particularly in the 
FLSA context. However, the observations presented about the failure to 
consider the intermediary role of managers apply to both the FLSA and 
the NLRA. 
Part II describes the limits and opportunities of using franchisor-
franchisee contracts as an analytical tool. Part III presents an empirical 
analysis of the top forty-four franchisor-franchisee contracts in 2016 to 
support the new intermediary theory of joint employment via franchisees’ 
supervisorial managers. This Part evinces the lines of inquiry that the new 
theory creates for courts, scholars, and executive branch agencies moving 
forward. The analysis considers franchisor relations with franchisees’ 
managers in a number of dimensions, including ongoing training and 
advising relationships. Along with the findings from the contractual 
analysis, Part III draws jurisprudential analogies from agricultural cases 
involving joint employment questions to further flesh out its proposed 
theory of influence through an intermediary party. 
Part IV describes the study’s implications for joint-employer law and 
policy in the FLSA and the NLRA contexts. It also proposes that, 
regardless of the role of managers, franchisees themselves may serve as 
intermediaries for franchisor influence in some brands. Finally, as 
mentioned above, Part IV questions the prevailing direct versus indirect 
frame of current debates in all three branches of government and proposes 
that we move toward a theory that considers the myriad ways the 
franchisor can influence the employment conditions of front-line workers. 
I. EXISTING JOINT EMPLOYER THEORIES 
A. A FLSA Primer for the Franchising Context 
The FLSA holds employers responsible for the wages and overtime 
premiums paid to employees. If more than one entity is an employer, 
courts and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) often refer to them as 
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“joint employers.”10 A prevailing FLSA plaintiff can recover damages for 
the wage-and-hour violations they suffer from one, or both, of the 
defendant employers.11 
The FLSA is silent with respect to franchising, or any other type of 
business organizational form. Instead, it has broad,12 flexibly worded, 
definitions of “employ,” “employer,” and “employee” that give judges 
and the DOL interpretive latitude. The FLSA expansively defines 
“employ,” for instance, as to “suffer or permit to work.”13 The definition 
of employer includes “any person acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”14 
Courts have developed various legal tests for joint employment, 
containing multiple legal factors to determine who is an employer. The 
Supreme Court has proclaimed that determinations should not depend on 
“isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole 
activity.”15 Common factors include an entity’s influence, or lack thereof, 
on wages, hiring and firing, job qualifications, training, scheduling and 
other working conditions.16 The FLSA’s language, supported by its 
legislative history, suggests that all entities that permit the performance of 
work and that are able to restrict wage-and-hour abuses, have obligations 
as an “employer.”17 
Before diving in, two caveats about FLSA joint-employer law are 
necessary. First, nothing in the FLSA itself connects the definition of 
“employer” only to entities that exhibit “control.”18 Along these lines, the 
                                                     
10. Joint employer liability is widely acknowledged in the FLSA context. See Rutherford Food 
Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1947); Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 
917–18 (9th Cir. 2003); 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2018).  
11. When there are two or more employers, the entities are jointly and severally liable for wage-
and-hour compliance in the franchisee’s restaurant. See Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 
972 (5th Cir. 1984); 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a). 
12. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that FLSA’s definition is “the broadest definition that has 
ever been included in any one act.” United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1945). The 
Court has often remarked that Congress used broad language to include relationships as “employment 
relationships” that would not have been found to be employer-employee relationships under common 
law right-to-control standards. See Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 729. 
13. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2018). 
14. Id. § 203(d). It also defines employees as individuals employed by employers. Id. § 203(e). 
15. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730.  
16. See infra Sections III.A(2)–(5). 
17. Bruce Goldstein, Marc Linder, Laurence E. Norton & Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Enforcing 
Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of 
Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1103 (1999) (arguing for a broad interpretation of “employ”). 
18. Kati L. Griffith, The Fair Labor Standards Act at 80: Everything Old Is New Again, 104 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 34) (on file with author) (systematically 
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U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower courts that the 
touchstone of the inquiry in the FLSA context is not common law agency 
relationships, but instead the “economic reality” of the relationship.19 
Despite these broad concepts of employment in the FLSA context, 
however, this Article will sometimes engage the term “control,” instead 
of more encompassing terms like “economic reality” or “influence.” 
Using this term facilitates an application to case law, legislative debates, 
and administrative battles that frequently engage the meaning of 
“control.” The concept of control also enables adaptation of the proposed 
intermediary theory of joint employment to the NLRA context, which 
relies on common law notions of control. 
Second, this Article also does not engage in the burgeoning debate 
about the extent to which a franchisor’s influence over working conditions 
to protect the brand is relevant to joint employment determinations. While 
this is an important question with extensive ramifications, opening up 
intermediary theories of influence in the joint employer context is the 
express purpose of this Article. The mechanism applies regardless of the 
outcome of the brand protection debate. Future work will need to develop 
frameworks that can disaggregate franchisor influence that is truly for 
brand protection (and thus excluded from the determination of whether a 
business has legal obligations).20 
As the two following sections depict, courts consistently overlook the 
intermediary role of franchisee managers, instead focusing their inquiries 
toward franchisor influence over front-line workers and franchisor 
influence over franchisees. These sections specifically consider the 
                                                     
reviewing the FLSA’s language and legislative history and concluding that Congress intended a broad 
definition of employ beyond common law notions of control). 
19. See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961). The “economic reality” 
touchstone has received judicial and scholarly criticism. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 
1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“It is comforting to know that ‘economic 
reality’ is the touchstone. One cringes to think that courts might decide these cases on the basis of 
economic fantasy. But ‘reality’ encompasses millions of facts, and unless we have a legal rule with 
which to sift the material from the immaterial, we might as well examine the facts through a 
kaleidoscope. Which facts matter, and why? A legal approach calling on judges to examine all of the 
facts, and balance them, avoids formulating a rule of decision.”); Michael C. Harper, The Restatement 
of Employment Law’s “Independent Business-Entrepreneurial Control” Test for Employee Status, in 
N.Y.U. 68TH ANN. CONFERENCE LAB., WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER? 45 (Kati 
L. Griffith & Sam Estreicher eds., 2015) (referencing vagueness and unpredictability related to 
FLSA’s economic realities test). 
20. See Michael Iadevaia, Separating the Fries from the Bag: A Proposed Framework for 
Separating Brand Control from Worker Control Under the NLRA (2018) (unpublished comment, 
Cornell University) (on file with author) (using the NLRA’s mandatory versus permissive subjects 
bargaining distinction as a proposed analytical framework for separating worker control from brand 
control). 
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eighteen cases available on Lexis Advance involving front-line worker 
claims that a franchisor was an employer under the FLSA,21 but the 
dynamics are similar in other areas of labor and employment law outside 
of the FLSA franchising context.22 Nine of the cases concluded that the 
franchisor was not an employer of the franchisee’s front-line work force.23 
The other nine, however, left room for this possibility and allowed the 
litigation to move forward. In other words, in nine of the eighteen cases, 
judges either denied motions to dismiss complaints against franchisors or 
granted plaintiffs’ motions to amend complaints to add the franchisor as 
a defendant in the case.24 
                                                     
21. The author and the author’s research assistants ran a variety of searches, but the primary 
research involved reviewing all federal case law containing both of the words “FLSA” and “franch.”  
22. See generally Charlotte Alexander, Direct and Indirect Employment Under Title VII, in N.Y.U. 
68TH ANN. CONFERENCE LAB., WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?, supra note 19, 
at 335; Marshall Babson, The Restated Joint-Employer Test as Articulated by the National Labor 
Relations Board, in N.Y.U. 68TH ANN. CONFERENCE LAB., WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE 
EMPLOYER?, supra note 19, at 261; Richard Griffin, Developments at the National Labor Relations 
Board, in N.Y.U. 68TH ANN. CONFERENCE LAB., WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE 
EMPLOYER?, supra note 19, at 253; Phillip Miscamarra, Who’s On First (As the NLRA Turns 80): The 
NLRB, Congress and the Courts?, in N.Y.U. 68TH ANN. CONFERENCE LAB., WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE 
AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?, supra note 19, at 279. 
23. Orozco v. Plackis, 757 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2014) (reversing the denial of a franchisor’s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law after jury trial in favor of the front-line worker); In re 
Domino’s Pizza Inc., No. 16-CV-2492(AJN)(KNF), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169607, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 30, 2018) (granting franchisor’s motion for a summary judgment); In re Jimmy John’s Overtime 
Litig., Nos. 14-C-5509, 15-C-1681, 15-C-6010, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107157, at *76–77 (N.D. Ill. 
June 14, 2018) (same); Pope v. Espeseth, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 884, 889–91 (W.D. Wis. 2017) 
(same); Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-1092-BR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172061, at 
*62–63 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2016) (same); Reese v. Coastal Restoration & Cleaning Servs., No. 1:10cv36-
RHW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132858, at *14–15 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2010) (same); Abdelkhaleq v. 
Precision Door, No. 5:07-CV-03585, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64464, at *16 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 
2008) (granting franchisor’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss worker’s claim); Singh v. 7-Eleven, 
Inc., No. C-05-04534(RMW), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16677, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (granting 
franchisor’s motion for a summary judgment); Howell v. Chick-Fil-A, Inc., No. 92-30188-RV, 1993 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at *18–19 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 1993) (same); see also Jacobson v. Comcast 
Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 683, 690 n.6 (D. Md. 2010) (“Courts evaluating franchise relationship[s] for 
joint employment have routinely concluded that a franchisor’s expansive control over a franchisee 
does not create a joint employment relationship [on its own].”). 
24. Bonaventura v. Gear Fitness One NY Plaza LLC, No. 17-Civ.-2168(ER), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
53269, at *13–18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018); Parrott v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 17-10359, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 144277, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2017); Lora v. Ledo Pizza Sys., Inc., No. DKC-16-
4002, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118474, at *17 (D. Md. July 27, 2017); Ocampo v. 455 Hospitality LLC, 
No. 14-CV-9614(KMK), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125928, at *23–31 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2016); Shupe v. 
DBJ Enters., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-308, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22284, at *4 n.2 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 
2015); Benitez v. Demco of Riverdale, LLC, No. 14-Civ.-7074(CM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20325, 
at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015); Cordova v. SCCF, Inc., No. 13-CIV-5665-LTS-HP, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 97388, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014); Olvera v. Bareburger Grp. LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201, 
208 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Cano v. DPNY, 287 F.R.D. 251, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Orozco, 757 
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B. Franchisor’s Influence over Franchisee’s Front-Line Workers 
Courts commonly home in on the immediate relationship between the 
franchisor and the franchisee’s front-line workers, referred to as 
crewmembers by some brands.25 A typical joint employer theory, thus, 
calls for a primary focus on franchisor’s (rather than franchisee’s) overt 
influence over the wages and working conditions of franchisee’s 
employees. In these cases, courts ask questions such as the following: 
Does the franchisor plainly set the wages of front-line workers?26 Does 
the franchisor supervise the front-line workers regularly? Does the 
franchisor affect key aspects of the front-line employees’ experiences at 
work, through benefits, scheduling, training, or other work-related 
requirements?27 
Simply put, the cases utilizing this analytical window do not 
predominantly examine the franchisor’s relationship with the franchisee, 
nor the franchisor’s relationship with the franchisee’s supervisorial 
managers. Rather, their main windows of inquiry predominantly consider 
the franchisor’s ongoing relationship with the franchisee’s front-line 
workers. The logic follows that, in some cases, the franchisor and the 
franchisee may each have sufficient influence over the wages and working 
conditions of front-line workers such that they are both employers with 
joint liability. There are numerous examples of this theory in FLSA case 
law involving wage claims against franchisors. For example, when 
dismissing a FLSA case against a window cleaning franchisor, a district 
court stated that “a joint employer relationship exists when each alleged 
employer exercises control over the working conditions” of the workers.28 
Other courts that have dismissed FLSA claims against franchisors have 
similarly stressed these separate lines of inquiry by noting that a joint 
employer determination results only if “each alleged employer” exhibits 
sufficient influence.29 A recent case from the Northern District of Illinois 
                                                     
F.3d at 452 (dismissing FLSA claim against franchisor but also clarifying, “[w]e do not suggest that 
franchisors can never qualify as the FLSA employer for a franchisee’s employees”). 
25. See Ochoa v. McDonald’s Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1235–36 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Juarez v. 
Jani-King of California, Inc., No. 09-3495(SC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7406, at *10–13 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 23, 2012); Reese, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132858, at *14; Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 333 
P.3d 723, 727–30 (Cal. 2014). 
26. See Cordova, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97388, at *21 (stating that one key inquiry was whether 
the defendant had control over “compensation policies” and wages). 
27. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947) (referencing factors that get at a 
business’s influence over wages and working conditions). 
28. Pope, 228 F. Supp. at 889 (emphasis added). 
29. E.g., In re Jimmy John’s Overtime Litig., Nos. 14-C-5509, 15-C-1681, 15-C-6010, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 107157, at *42 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2018) (“A joint employer relationship exists where 
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involving the Jimmy John’s brand characterized joint employer findings 
as cases whereby “each alleged employer exercises control over the 
working conditions of the employees.”30 
While this joint employer theory requires each entity to have sufficient 
influence over the front-line workers, some courts acknowledge that joint 
employers do not need to exert equal amounts of influence over the 
worker to find an employment relationship. As a judge in the Southern 
District of New York recently put it, “[e]ven where one entity exerts 
ultimate control over a worker, another entity may still exert a sufficient 
amount of control over the employee to qualify it as a joint employer 
under the FLSA.”31 
C. Franchisor’s Influence over Franchisee 
Theories of joint employment do not solely concentrate on the 
franchisor’s relationship with front-line workers. A strain of joint 
employer theory in the wage-and-hour context, as well as the franchising 
literature more broadly,32 interrogates the relationship between the 
franchisor and the franchisee.33 The franchisor-franchisee relationship is 
the central point of inquiry. 
Some of these courts employ a type of aggregation theory. They add 
franchisor influence over front-line workers to franchisee influence over 
front-line workers to determine if the two entities’ combined influence is 
sufficient to establish a joint employer relationship. For instance, a 
Maryland district court, applying the Fourth Circuit’s joint-employer 
framework,34 inquired whether the franchisor and franchisee “[share] or 
                                                     
each alleged employer exercises control over the working conditions of the employees.”); accord 
Orozco, 757 F.3d at 448 (“In joint employer contexts, each employer must meet the economic reality 
test.”); Reese, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132858, at *6 (“A claim brought under the FLSA first requires 
facts showing the existence of an employment relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant, in this 
case between Reese [worker] and SERVPRO [franchisor].”). 
30. In re Jimmy John’s, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107157, at *42. 
31. Bonaventura v. Gear Fitness One NY Plaza LLC, No. 17-Civ.-2168(ER), 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 53269, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2018) (citing Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 258 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)). 
32. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete 
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 928 (1990); Peter C. Lagarias, Franchising in California: 
Uniformity in California Franchise Agreements, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 136, 136 (2002); Paul Steinberg 
& Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 105, 106 (2004). 
33. Lora v. Ledo Pizza Sys., Inc., No. DKC-16-4002, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118474, at *14 (D. 
Md. July 27, 2017) (“[T]he allegations in the amended complaint must show a relationship among the 
franchisor, the franchisee, and the plaintiff that demonstrates an employment relationship.”). 
34. Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 142 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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[codetermine] the essential terms and conditions of a worker’s 
employment.”35 The Fourth Circuit similarly critiqued a district court’s 
omission of consideration of the relationship between the two parties by 
stating that it “ignored important elements of coordination between 
Defendants, as well as many of Defendants’ shared levers of influence 
over Plaintiffs’ work.”36 
Other courts scrutinize how the franchisor influences the franchisees’ 
behavior. In Cordova v. SCCF, Inc.,37 the court found that the franchisor’s 
relationship with the franchisee was potentially relevant to the FLSA 
claim, so it refused to dismiss the complaint against the franchisor.38 
Specifically, it highlighted franchisor activities like creating delivery 
procedures for the franchisee and providing software programs so that the 
franchisee could track the workers’ delivery times, wages, hours, and 
performance. Moreover, Reese v. Coastal Restoration & Cleaning 
Services39 suggests that courts can consider—and reject—franchisor 
influence over franchisee arguments.40 It concluded that the evidence on 
the record did not support the worker’s theory “that his employment 
‘extended through’” the franchisee to the franchisor “by virtue of the 
franchise license agreement” between the two parties.41 
Courts have even considered whether some franchisors and franchisees 
are so interconnected as to be a “single enterprise” and, thus, constitute a 
combined employer of front-line workers. This notion has garnered some 
resistance.42 Other courts have contemplated whether the franchisee is an 
employee of the franchisor, such that the front-line workers are the 
                                                     
35. Lora, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118474, at *14–17 (citing Salinas, 848 F.3d at 142); see also Hall 
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 767 (4th Cir 2017) (stating that “we first must determine whether 
the defendant and one or more additional entities shared, agreed to allocate responsibility for, or 
otherwise codetermined the key terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s work”). 
36. Hall, 846 F.3d at 770. 
37. No. 13-CIV-5665-LTS-HP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97388 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014). 
38. Id. at *6–7. 
39. No. 1:10cv36-RHW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132858 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2010).  
40. Id. at *14. 
41. Id.; see also Ping Chen v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., No. 09-107(JAP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
96362, at *10 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2009) (“Courts have consistently held that the franchisor/franchisee 
relationship does not create an employment relationship between a franchisor and a franchisee’s 
employees.”). 
42. See, e.g., Marshall v. Shan-An-Dan, 747 F.2d 1084, 1089 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he shared right 
to use the brand name of a manufacturer or distributor between a franchisor and a franchisee does not 
make the two a single entity for purposes of FLSA.”); Ping Chen, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96362, at 
*10 (same). 
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franchisor’s employees.43 There are also cases that examine franchisor-
franchisee relations, but do not involve front-line workers at all. Instead, 
these cases involve franchisee claims that they are employees and that the 
franchisor did not properly pay them minimum wages and overtime 
premiums under the FLSA. Some courts have allowed a franchisee’s 
wage-and-hour claim against a franchisor to move forward,44 while others 
have swiftly granted dismissals to franchisor defendants.45 
Even though this Article has separated the two common mechanisms 
of influence to make an analytical point, courts are not always exclusively 
in one category or the other. FLSA franchising cases sometimes show a 
simultaneous consideration of franchisor relations with the franchisee’s 
front-line workers and franchisor relations with the franchisee itself. In 
Olvera v. Bareburger Group LLC,46 for example, the court found the 
franchisor’s direct relationship with front-line employees relevant.47 It 
denied a motion to dismiss the complaint, in part because plaintiff 
crewmembers had alleged that the franchisor “monitored employee 
performance.”48 The court also found relevant, however, the franchisor’s 
relationship with the franchisee. It considered such factors as franchisor 
guidance to franchisees “on ‘how to hire and train employees.’”49 
An interrogation of the existing case law suggests that courts have not 
seriously considered the relationship between franchisors and franchisees’ 
managers. In the following sections, this Article systematically examines 
franchisor-franchisee contracts and highlights how such an analysis 
exposes the importance of franchisor relations with franchisee managers. 
                                                     
43. Howell v. Chick-Fil-A, No. 92-30188-RV, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at *6–8 (N.D. Fla. 
Nov. 1, 1993) (concluding that franchisor was not the employer of the franchisee, and thus not the 
employer of the franchisee’s front-line workers). 
44. See, e.g., Fernandez v. JaniKing Int’l, Inc., No. H-17-1401, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13300, at 
*12–13 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2018) (allowing plaintiff franchisees to amend complaints claiming 
franchisors were “employers” under FLSA); Naik v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 13-4578(RMB/JS), 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107139, at *28–29 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2014) (concluding that plaintiff franchisees had 
properly alleged employer-employee relationship with their franchisor). 
45. See Haitayan v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. CV-17-7454-JFW (JPRx), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82683, 
at *20 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2018); 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Sodhi, No. 13-3715(MAS)(JS), 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 70794, at *22 (D.N.J. May 31, 2016). 
46. 73 F. Supp. 3d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
47. Id. at 206–08. 
48. Id. at 207.  
49. Id.; see also Ocampo v. 455 Hosp. LLC, No. 14-CV-9614(KMK), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
125928, at *19–30 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2016). 
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II. CONTRACTS AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL 
Why use formal legal instruments, like contracts, to understand real 
world relationships between parties? When it comes to defining what it 
means to “employ” someone, the FLSA is unwavering in its emphasis on 
how relationships actually play out in practice. Undoubtedly and 
importantly, contracts can only tell us about the formal legal boundaries 
of a relationship. They cannot tell us about the day-to-day realities of a 
workplace. They cannot paint a comprehensive picture of the franchisor’s 
role in the work lives of franchisees’ employees. They are merely 
suggestive of reality, not determinative.50 Ultimately, all questions about 
whether a business is an “employer” require close and exhaustive 
examination of how that business relates to the worker’s working 
conditions and wages.51 
These substantial qualifications notwithstanding, there are a number of 
reasons for turning to legal contracts in studies of employment 
relationships. First, sometimes the contract is evidence of the existence of 
an employment relationship. In this vein, some courts have declared that 
while a business’s “self-serving label” of someone as an “independent 
contractor” is not relevant, the business’s labeling of someone as an 
“employee” is “highly probative” of an employment relationship.52 The 
Fifth Circuit relied on a business’s treatment of a plaintiff as an 
“employee” under tax law as a probative factor indicating employment 
status.53 Even though tax law has separate definitions of employee status, 
                                                     
50. For cases noting the limits of contractual language, see Ochoa v. McDonald’s Corp., 133 F. 
Supp. 3d 1228, 1235–39 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (discounting relevance of contractual language to joint 
employer determination); Reese v. Coastal Restoration & Cleaning Servs., Inc., No. 1:10cv36-RHW, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132858, at *9–12 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2010) (referring to contractual 
language a simply relating to quality control standards); compare Alberter v. McDonald’s Corp., 70 F. 
Supp. 2d 1138, 1144–45 (D. Nev. 1999) (referring to contract language as requiring licensee “to 
adhere to the policies set forth in the business manuals, including the personnel policies” but also 
saying that manual itself “states that licensees may choose to adopt the policies it sets out or may set 
their own policies with respect to personnel”). 
51. See generally Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (discussing the 
importance of broadly considering all relevant factors in the relationship between the putative 
employer and the workers who suffered FLSA violations). 
52. See Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988); Robicheaux v. Radcliff 
Material, Inc., 697 F.2d 662, 667 (5th Cir. 1983) (declaring that “[a]n employee is not permitted to 
waive employee status,” and holding welders to be employees even though they had signed 
independent contractor agreements); Powers v. Emcon Assocs., No. 14-cv-03006-KMT, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 148751, at *16 (D. Colo. Sept. 14, 2017) (stating that it is relevant that the employment 
agreement “repeatedly refers to Plaintiff Powers as an ‘employee’ and never refers to him as an 
‘independent contractor’”). 
53. Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., Inc., 821 F.2d 261, 268 n.5 (5th Cir. 1987), modified on other 
grounds on reh’g, 826 F.2d 2 (1987). 
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this fact helped paint a picture of a dependency relationship between the 
business and the worker in that case.54 In the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
seminal FLSA case involving the definition of employment, the Court 
gave no weight to a business’s use of the independent contractor label. 
The Court concluded that, while there were contracts, they were for labor 
that was central to the enterprise, not for specialized work typically 
conducted by an independent contractor.55 
Second, analyzing contracts is useful because it sheds light on the 
power relations between the contractual parties, which may be relevant to 
questions about who has the power to alter working conditions and wages 
on the ground. As Professor Cunningham-Parmeter adeptly put it when 
theorizing about how to view employment relations in the modern 
economy, “businesses that control contractual outcomes frequently 
control working conditions as well.”56 Scholars have observed that 
contracts are one way that franchisors affect the relationship they have 
with franchisees and influence the workings of franchisee 
establishments.57 A primary strain of this research challenges, as Professor 
Andrew Elmore recently did, the notion that franchisors and franchisees 
engage in “an arms-length” business relationship.58 In other words, it is a 
                                                     
54. Id. Lawyers have been proposing new contractual language in an effort to reduce franchisors’ 
joint employer liability. See, e.g., Susan A. Grueneberg, Joshua Schneiderman & Lulu Y. Chiu, 
Drafting Franchise Agreements After Patterson v. Domino’s: Avoiding the Minefield of Vicarious 
Liability and Joint Employment, 36 FRANCHISE L.J. 189, 196–218 (2016) (offering new language 
relating to such things as brand standards and training). For example, some propose language that 
states that the franchisee, not the franchisor, independently controls the wages and working conditions 
of franchisees’ employees. Other proposed language declares that the franchisee is an “independent 
contractor,” not an employee of the franchisor. See Citadel Panda Express, Inc. License Agreement 
§ 5.1A, I, at 5–6 (Apr. 2016); Culver Franchising Systems, Inc. Franchise Agreement § 10.D, at B-
13, § 3.B.2, at B-5 (Mar. 29, 2016); Del Taco, LLC Franchise Agreement § D7, at 9–11 (2016); 
Firehouse of America, LLC Franchise Agreement § 6.1, at 12, § 4.5(b), at 10, § 16.2, at 30 (Mar. 28, 
2016); Jamba Juice Franchise Agreement § 17.1, at 40 (Apr. 22, 2016); Pizza Hut, Inc. Location 
Franchise Agreement § 4.1.A, at 6, § 4.1.B., at 6 (Apr. 1, 2016). For an explanation of where to locate 
these agreements, please see infra note 64. 
55. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1947); see also Griffith, supra note 
18 (manuscript at 39–41) (detailing the ways that the FLSA’s legislative history shows that Congress 
intended to ensure that a business’ self-serving labels and formalities did not make it immune from 
the FLSA’s reach). 
56. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern 
Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1727–28 (2016). 
57. Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting the Debate 
over Franchise Relationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REV. 193, 194 (2013) (“[C]ast[ing] doubt on the 
assumption that franchisees are well-informed business people.”). 
58. See, e.g., Andrew Elmore, The Future of Fast Food Governance, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 
73 (2017) [hereinafter Elmore, Future of Fast Food], https://www.pennlawreview.com/ 
essays/index.php?id=49 [https://perma.cc/C5ZV-26DE] (referring to relationship as one of 
“continuous dependence”); id. at 75–76 (“Franchisors extend this initially superior bargaining 
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fictitious idea that the parties are both acting in their own self-interests, 
and are not highly influenced by the other party.59 This work is another 
example of the David-and-Goliath-style relationship between franchisors 
and franchisees brought to the forefront by the “Fight for Fifteen and a 
Union” movement, referenced in the Introduction. 
Professor Gillian Hadfield’s oft-cited study of contractual relations 
between franchisors and franchisees in 1990 convincingly demonstrates 
that the franchisor, not the franchisee, dictates the essential terms of the 
contract.60 Scholars widely agree that we can interpret contractual terms 
as franchisor’s requirements, even when they are not termed as such.61 
The franchisee has very little bargaining power to change the terms of a 
brand’s boilerplate contract. Consistent with this view, many of the 
contracts analyzed for this Article were written from the first-person 
perspective of the franchisor. The contractual language, for example, 
often refers to “us” (franchisor) and “you” (franchisee) when listing the 
requirements of the contract.62 
Third, and finally, it is particularly appropriate to consider contracts 
when constructing legal theories and proposing avenues of inquiry. Courts 
and administrative agencies can later test these avenues through an 
examination of real-world circumstances on the ground. This Article uses 
contractual analysis in this limited manner. Contracts can illuminate the 
legal contours of the relationship between the franchisor and the 
franchisee’s business,63 which can help administrative agencies, courts, 
researchers, and legislators understand some aspects of the broader 
context and nature of the relationship. An understanding of contractual 
terms can open up new areas of inquiry, as evidenced by the prevalence 
of contractual terms referencing franchisees’ managers, rather than 
franchisees’ front-line workers. This finding from the contract analysis 
forms the basis of a new theory of joint employment based on franchisor 
influence over front-line fast-food workers via franchisees’ managers. 
                                                     
position into the franchise relationship with incomplete contract terms that shift risk to franchisees 
and leave the franchisors’ duties to franchisees undefined.”); Andrew Elmore, Franchise Regulation 
in the Fissured Economy, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 907 (2018) [hereinafter Elmore, Franchise 
Regulation]. 
59. See Elmore, Future of Fast Food, supra note 58, at 75–76. 
60. Hadfield, supra note 32, at 991. 
61. See infra discussion and footnotes in Section IV.B. 
62. See, e.g., Grueneberg, Schneiderman & Chiu, supra note 54, at 196–218. 
63. All of the franchise contracts set out legal obligations between the franchisor (brand) and the 
franchisee (sometimes referred to as the “operator”). See, e.g., Sonic Franchising LLC License 
Agreement (2016). 
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III. PROPOSED THEORY: FRANCHISOR’S INFLUENCE OVER 
FRANCHISEE’S MANAGERS 
This Article proposes a third theory of joint employment, via 
franchisees’ supervisorial managers. Unlike franchisees, franchisees’ 
managers do not have an ownership interest in the franchise. Nonetheless, 
franchisees’ managers do have influence over front-line workers at 
franchised stores. If the franchisor influences the franchisees’ 
supervisorial managers and those managers influence the franchisees’ 
front-line employees, it follows that the franchisor affects the franchisees’ 
front-line employees. If the franchisor employs the manager, by force of 
logic, the front-line employee is an employee of the franchisor. On the 
other hand, even if the manager is not an employee of the franchisor, the 
manager may still serve as a pass-through device for franchisor influence 
over front-line employees in certain circumstances. Figure 1 illustrates the 
relationships of influence that this proposed intermediary legal theory 
highlights in the franchising context. 
 
Figure 1: 
Franchisor’s Relations with Franchisee’s Managers 
 
 
Regardless of the direct or indirect distinction, this avenue would 
constitute franchisor influence over front-line workers in the FLSA 
context. 
This Part relies on an analysis of forty-four contracts between 
franchisors and franchisees in the U.S. fast-food industry from 2016. The 
   Front-line Worker 
Franchisor Franchisee 
Franchisee 
Manager 
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research team found forty-four contracts through two portals available to 
the public: The Minnesota Commerce Department and the Wisconsin 
Department of Financial Institutions.64 We searched for contracts for all 
fifty-two brands that a leading restaurant industry publication (QSR 
Magazine) listed in its “top 50” fast-food brands for either 2015 or 2016.65 
This search strategy did not yield contracts for all brands listed in the 
“top 50” because a handful of brands do not franchise (e.g., Starbucks), 
and because three others do not operate, or have information available, in 
the states of Minnesota or Wisconsin.66 Nonetheless, the forty-four brand 
contracts analyzed here represent the vast majority of top fast-food 
brands. 
This study’s analysis of contractual terms shows that franchisors’ 
influence over franchisees’ managers could be greater than their influence 
over franchisees’ front-line workers. The dominant analytical lenses do 
not consider franchisees’ managers, so courts and administrative agencies 
to date have not seriously considered managers as potential employees of 
the franchisor, or as pass-throughs for franchisors’ instructions relating to 
front-line workers. The findings here suggest a new story of franchisor 
influence through franchisee managers. Namely, the findings show that 
there is a comparatively higher volume of contract provisions pertaining 
to managers than to front-line employees in areas such as hiring/firing, 
job qualifications, scheduling/staffing, and training. 
A. Contract Data on Managers 
1. A Comparatively Higher Level of Franchisor Influence 
As detailed by Table 1, when comparing managerial versus non-
managerial labor terms, there were more contracts with franchisor 
                                                     
64. All of the franchise agreements cited throughout this Article are available online either at the 
Minnesota Commerce Department or the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions. See 
Commerce Actions and Regulatory Documents Search, MINN. COM. DEP’T, 
https://www.cards.commerce.state.mn.us/CARDS/ [https://perma.cc/CBS8-LUEQ]; Franchise 
Search, WISC. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., https://www.wdfi.org/apps/FranchiseSearch/MainSearch.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/D246-V4T7].  
65. See The QSR 50, QSR, https://www.qsrmagazine.com/content/qsr50-2017-top-50-chart 
[https://perma.cc/MMX8-HGR7]. 
66. To locate franchisor-franchisee contracts, the researchers searched for all brands listed using 
Minnesota’s Commerce Department website. When a 2016 contract was not available through 
Minnesota’s portal, the research team turned to Wisconsin’s portal to see if the contract was available. 
We did not code eight of fifty-two brands listed on the QSR top 50 lists for the following reasons: 
five do not franchise, and therefore do not have franchising contracts (Starbucks, Chipotle, White 
Castle, Boston Market, and In-n-Out Burger); two did not operate in Minnesota or Wisconsin 
(Whataburger and El Pollo Loco); and one operated in Wisconsin but not Minnesota (Church’s 
Chicken) and the 2016 link had expired by the time we conducted the search.  
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requirements about franchisees’ managerial employees in the area of 
hiring/firing qualifications (eighteen contracts versus thirteen contracts), 
restrictions on job mobility from one franchisee to another (thirty-six 
versus thirty-two), staffing/scheduling (thirty-three versus nineteen), and 
training (thirty-eight versus twenty-five). At minimum, this comparison 
indicates that franchisors are likely to be more hands on with franchisees’ 
managers than they are with franchisees’ front-line employees. 
 
Table 1: 
Managerial Versus Non-Managerial Labor Terms  
in 2016 Franchisor-Franchisee Contracts (n=44) 
 
Contract Terms / 
Legal Factors 
Non-Managerial 
Employees 
Managerial 
Employees 
Franchisor Required 
Hiring / Firing 
Qualifications 
13 18 
Franchisor Required 
Restrictions on Job 
Mobility / Poaching 
32 36 
Franchisor Required  
Staffing / Scheduling 19 33 
Franchisor Required 
Training 25 38 
 
The case law confirms that a business’s involvement in areas 
represented in the left column of Table 1, along with wage setting and 
influence over other working conditions, is relevant to determinations of 
whether a business entity is “an employer.”67 
2. Franchisor’s Influence over Hiring/Firing of Managers 
The analysis of forty-four fast-food contracts suggests that some 
franchisors exert influence over the working conditions of franchisees’ 
managers by mandating a minimum number of managerial hires at each 
restaurant, by requiring that franchisees’ managers have certain job 
qualifications, and/or by reserving the right to hire/fire franchisees’ 
managers when they are not meeting franchisors’ expectations. As Table 
1 illustrates, close to half of all contracts contained clauses that included 
                                                     
67. See infra Sections III.A(2)–(5). 
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this content. These dynamics constitute an area that courts, regulators, and 
advocates should not ignore moving forward. 
Some contracts specify the number of managers that a franchisee 
should hire at a particular restaurant, which is most often one or two 
managers at a time.68 Steak N Shake’s franchisor-franchisee contract goes 
further. It explicitly mentions that the franchisor, “from time to time,” can 
“designate select managers available for hiring by franchisees.”69 Other 
contracts more obtusely require that the franchisee hire “a sufficient 
number,” or “an adequate number,” of franchisee managers to render good 
service at the restaurant.70 
A group of the contracts reveal that some franchisors may require 
franchisees’ managers to have particular job qualifications. For general 
managers, or business managers, the requirements are sometimes quite 
explicit. The Five Guys contract states that the general manager “must 
satisfy our educational and business criteria” which are in the manuals and 
“must be individually acceptable to us.”71 
Even beyond general managers, some contracts expressly provide 
franchisors with the right to designate the qualifications of all franchisees’ 
employees, including franchisees’ managers.72 The Arby’s contract 
                                                     
68. See Captain D’s Franchise Agreement § 11, at 10 (May 1, 2016); Jason’s Deli Management, 
Inc. Franchise Agreement § 9(d), at 11 (Apr. 1, 2016); McAlister’s Deli Franchise Agreement 
§ 11.1C, at 21 (Apr. 1, 2016); Panera, LLC Franchise Agreement § 8.04, at 13, § 8.05, at 13 (Mar. 
2016); Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen Franchise Agreement § 8.03, at 23 (Mar. 2016); Qdoba Mexican 
Eats Franchise Agreement § 15.2 (Mar. 2017); Sonic Franchising LLC License Agreement § 6.04, at 
10 (2016). 
69. Steak N Shake Enterprises, Inc. Unit Franchise Agreement § 12.3(C), at 65. 
70. See Dunkin’ Donuts Franchising, LLC Franchise Agreement § 7.0.6, at 7 (Mar. 30, 2016); 
Einstein Bros. Bagels Franchise Corporation Franchise Agreement § 8.7, at 20 (July 13, 2016); Steak 
N Shake Enterprises, Inc. Unit Franchise Agreement § 1.5(C), at 7. 
71. Five Guys Franchise Agreement item 15, at 38 (Apr. 29, 2016); see also, e.g., Einstein Bros. 
Bagels Franchise Corporation Franchise Agreement item 11, at 35 (July 13, 2016) (“The Franchised 
Business Manager must have at least three years of experience working in a management capacity in 
a quick service restaurant or fast casual restaurant . . . .”); Qdoba Mexican Eats Franchise Agreement 
§ 15.2 (Mar. 2017) (“[M]ust have at least one (1) year of experience as a General Manager in the 
restaurant industry.”); Steak N Shake Enterprises, Inc. Unit Franchise Agreement § 1.6(B), at 8–9 
(“Franchisee shall not make an offer of employment to the General Manager or Restaurant Manager 
without first obtaining Franchisor’s prior written consent that the foregoing requirements have been 
met and the proposed salary for the General Manager meets Franchisor’s minimum salary 
guidelines.”); Taco Bell Corp. Franchise Agreement § 3.1, at 2 (Mar. 25, 2016) (“Franchisee or a 
qualified manager of the Restaurant shall maintain his or her personal principal residence within a 
usual driving time of approximately one hour from the Restaurant.”). 
72. See, e.g., Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC Franchise Agreement § 4A(1), at 16, 18 (Apr. 20, 2016) 
(“[Y]our on-site managers must pass the operations-proficiency test and receive management 
certification. . . . All certified managers present at the RESTAURANT . . . must be able to speak, 
read, write, and understand the English language fluently so they can, as applicable, pass the portions 
of our training program.”). 
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claims that the franchisor “has the right to designate in its sole judgment 
Restaurant personnel qualifications.”73 Commonly, fast-food contracts 
require franchisees to replace franchisee managers that the franchisors 
“disapprove of.”74 In this vein, Einstein Bros. Bagels’s contract states that 
“if we disapprove of any of the Highly Trained Personnel, then you agree 
to enroll a qualified replacement.”75 Similarly, Firehouse Subs 
contractually requires franchisees to replace “any manager” if the 
franchisor determines “he or she is not qualified to manage the 
restaurant.”76 McAlister’s Deli concludes that the franchisor reserves the 
right to “revoke certification for a Certified Management Trainer.”77 
These contractual terms suggest that some franchisors influence key areas 
of manager hiring and firing. 
Courts widely recognize that the power to hire and fire is a critical 
determinant of a business’s employer status.78 In Cano v. DPNY, Inc.,79 
for instance, the court, when granting leave to file a second amended 
complaint, noted the relevance of allegations that the franchisor 
(Domino’s) “developed and implemented hiring policies such as systems 
for screening, interviewing, and assessing applicants for employment at 
                                                     
73. Arby’s Franchisor, LLC License Agreement § 6.1, at 7 (2016).  
74. See, e.g., Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc. Franchise Agreement § 8.04, at 20 (Mar. 2016) 
(“We reserve the right to approve or disapprove of any manager-level employee you appoint.”); Steak 
N Shake Enterprises, Inc. Unit Franchise Agreement 5.3(K), at 34 (“Franchisee shall replace any 
manager who the Franchisor determines is not qualified to manage a Restaurant in accordance with 
the System.”). 
75. Einstein Bros. Bagels Franchise Corporation Franchise Agreement § 6.2.4, at 15. 
76. Firehouse of America, LLC Franchise Agreement, § 6.1, at 12 (Mar. 28, 2016). 
77. McAlister’s Deli Franchise Agreement § 11.1C, at 21 (Apr. 1, 2016). 
78. See Orozco v. Plackis, 757 F.3d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that a business’s 
ability to hire and fire is highly indicative of an employment relationship); Marshall v. Shan-An-Dan, 
Inc., 747 F.2d 1084, 1087 (6th Cir. 1984) (same); Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 51941, at *63 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2016) (same); Brunner v. Liautaud, No. 14-C-5509, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 46018, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2015) (same); Benitez v. Demco of Riverdale, LLC, 
No. 14-Civ.-7074, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20325, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015) (same); Cordova v. 
SCCF, Inc., No. 13-CIV-5665-LTS-HP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97388, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 
2014) (same); Olvera v. Bareburger Grp. LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same); 
Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 238 F.R.D. 251, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same); Reese v. Coastal Restoration & 
Cleaning Servs., No. 1:10cv36-RHW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132858, at *8 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 
2010) (same); Ping Chen v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., No. 09-107(JAP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96362, 
at *13 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2009) (same); Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. C-05-04534(RMW), 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16677, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (same); Howell v. Chick-Fil-A, Inc., No. 92-
30188-RV, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at *10 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 1993) (same); Donovan v. 
Breaker of America, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (same). 
79. 287 F.R.D. 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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all of their stores.”80 If the franchisor is influencing personnel 
qualifications of franchisees’ managers, that would be a factor in favor of 
finding an employment relationship between the franchisor and the 
franchisees’ managers. Even if there is no employment relationship 
between the franchisor and franchisees’ managers, however, it still would 
be indicative of franchisor power over managers. 
3. Franchisor’s Influence over Job Mobility of Managers 
The majority of contracts suggest that franchisors may affect the job 
qualifications of franchisees’ managers through “anti-poaching” clauses. 
These contractual clauses formally restrict franchisees from hiring or 
recruiting managers from other franchisees within the same brand. These 
clauses, and practices surrounding them, demand further scrutiny as they 
relate to potential franchisor influence over job qualifications of 
franchisees’ managers and employees. As elaborated upon above, 
influence over hiring and job qualifications is a central factor across all 
aspects of joint employer theory. 
In our 2016 sample of contracts, thirty-six out of forty-four contracts 
incorporated some form of anti-poaching clause. These clauses have 
received a lot of negative attention.81 A Fall 2017 New York Times article 
cited research by a pair of economists who suggested that these clauses 
may be holding down wages in the fast-food industry.82 In the language 
of these economists, Professors Alan Kruegar and Eric Posner, “the 
proliferation of no-poaching agreements has increased franchise 
companies’ monopsony power over workers in recent decades.”83 
Moreover, anti-poaching clauses have been the subject of lawsuits. In 
2018, close to a dozen state governments threatened to challenge their use 
                                                     
80. Id. at 260 (motion for leave to file a second amended complaint); cf. Reese, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 132858, at *10 (considering whether background check was an indicator of control over hiring 
and concluding that it was merely a quality control mechanism). 
81. Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the 
Franchise Sector 22 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 614, 2017), 
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp014f16c547g [https://perma.cc/VZ5G-UFGC]. 
82. Rachel Abrams, Why Aren’t Paychecks Growing? A Burger-Joint Clause Offers a Clue, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/pay-growth-fast-food-
hiring.html [https://perma.cc/PY25-3D5R]. 
83. ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR 
PROTECTING LOW-INCOME WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 9 (2018), 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_monopsony_col
lusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HT5-WBS5]. 
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in some states.84 Amidst growing criticism, some brands have started to 
remove such clauses from their contracts with franchisees moving 
forward.85 
The vast majority of the clauses from the 2016 sample restrict 
franchisee solicitation of all employees (managerial and non-managerial) 
of other franchisees within the same brand. They restrict franchisees’ 
employee recruitment efforts and franchisee managers’ potential to shift 
to another franchisee’s restaurant. Zaxby’s is representative of this 
grouping of contracts. It limits franchisees’ abilities to “solicit, entice, or 
induce” any employees of Zaxby’s or its other franchisees.86 
Four of the thirty-six contracts with this term, however, limited their 
application to managerial (rather than non-managerial) employees. In this 
context, the category of managerial employee often includes all level of 
managers, including “shift leaders.”87 The Del Taco contractual provision 
prohibits a Del Taco franchisee’s employment, or solicitation, of any 
manager (shift manager or above) without “the other [franchisee’s] 
written consent.”88 Similarly, the Pizza Hut franchisor-franchisee contract 
                                                     
84. John Herzfeld, 11 States Probe Fast-Food Companies on ‘No-Poach’ Pacts, BNA NEWS (July 
9, 2018), https://www.bna.com/11-states-probe-n73014477201/ [https://perma.cc/4END-T3JS] (“A 
coalition of 11 state attorneys general questioned fast-food restaurant chains on ‘no-poach’ 
agreements that restrict franchisees from recruiting or hiring from other outlets in the same chain.”); 
Washington Post, States Launch Investigation Targeting Fast-food Hiring Practices, LA TIMES (July 
9, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-fast-food-no-poach-20180709-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/JFV9-G5VY] (referring to almost a dozen state attorney general lawsuits that target 
“a practice some economists say drags down wages for millions of Americans”); see also id. (“Sens. 
Cory Booker (D-N.J.) and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) said in March that they would introduce 
legislation to make no-poaching agreements illegal, calling them an ‘anti-competitive’ practice.”); id. 
(“The U.S. Department of Justice’s antitrust division has also opened an inquiry into the practice.”). 
85. Herzfeld, supra note 84. 
86. Zaxby’s Franchsing, LLC Licensing Agreement § 8(B)(3), at 26 (Apr. 2016); see also Arby’s 
Franchisor, LLC License Agreement § 13.1, at 15 (2016); Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC Franchise 
Agreement § 7(d), at 27–28 (Apr. 20, 2016); McAlister Deli Franchise Agreement § 15.4(A)(v), at 
31 (Apr. 1, 2016); Moe’s Southwest Grill Franchise Agreement § 15.4(A)(v), at 31 (Apr. 1, 2016); 
Auntie Anne’s Franchise Agreement § 15.4(A)(v), at 31 (Apr. 1, 2016); Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen 
Franchise Agreement § 13.02(B), at 39–40 (Mar. 2016); Wingstop Restaurants Inc. Franchise 
Agreement for a Wingstop Restaurant § 7(c)(10), at 11 (2016). 
87. See, e.g., Carl’s Jr. Restaurant Franchise Agreement § 17C(2)(b), at 31 (May 2016) 
(“Franchisee shall not . . . [k]nowingly employ or seek to employ any person then employed by CJR 
or any franchisee of CJR as a shift leader or higher, or otherwise directly or indirectly induce such 
person to leave his or her employment.”). 
88. Del Taco LLC Franchise Agreement § 32, at 34 (2016) (“During the term of this Agreement, 
neither Del Taco nor the Franchisee shall employ or seek to employ, directly or indirectly, any person 
serving in a managerial position for the other party or its subsidiaries or for any other franchisee in 
the Del Taco System, except with the other employer’s written consent. For purposes of this Section, 
‘managerial position’ shall include all restaurant employees who serve as shift managers and above.”); 
see also Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. Franchise Agreement § 15.2.3, at 35–36 (2016). 
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restricts franchisees’ current managers, or managers that worked at a 
Pizza Hut during the prior six months, from moving to another Pizza 
Hut.89 
Furthermore, a majority of contracts go beyond solicitation restrictions 
and outright restrict employment of an employee who has worked for 
another franchisee within the brand. They specifically restrict solicitation 
and employment of recruits from other franchisees within the brand. 
While the language varies from contract to contract, and some contracts 
allow employment if the other employer (franchisee) consents, these 
twenty-four contracts from 2016 share an explicit job qualification.90 
Franchisor-created poaching clauses clearly restrict job qualifications for 
franchisee employees and franchisees’ freedom in their hiring decisions. 
They are, at minimum, suggestive of franchisor influence over the hiring 
of franchisees’ managers. 
4. Franchisor’s Influence over Staffing/Scheduling of Managers 
A number of 2016 contracts reveal that franchisors may affect the 
staffing and scheduling of managers at their franchised restaurants. This 
finding calls for more interrogation regarding the ways that franchisors 
influence the staffing levels and scheduling of franchisees’ managers. 
Thirty-three out of forty-four contracts contained requirements relating 
to the ongoing staffing or scheduling of managers. Most typically, these 
                                                     
89. Pizza Hut, Inc. Location Franchise Agreement § 13.2, at 17 (Apr. 1, 2016) (Franchisee may not 
“employ, directly or indirectly, and individual in a managerial position who is at the time, or was at 
any time during the prior 6 months, employed in a managerial position by the other party.”). 
90. Bojangles’ International, LLC Franchise Agreement § XI(A)(1)(b), at 30 (June 14, 2016); 
Burger King Franchise Agreement (Corporate) § 5(L), at 8 (Apr. 2016); Captain D’s, LLC Franchise 
Agreement § 12, at 10 (May 1, 2016); Carl’s Jr. Restaurant Franchise Agreement § 17C(2)(b), at 31 
(May 2016); Citadel Panda Express, Inc. License Agreement § 8.2(A), at 11 (Apr. 2016); Culver 
Franchising System, Inc. Franchise Agreement § 20(C), at B-25 (Mar. 29, 2016); Domino’s Pizza 
Franchising LLC Standard Franchise Agreement § 20.4, at 33 (Jan. 2013); Dunkin’ Donuts Franchise 
Agreement § 7.0.6, at 7 (Mar. 30, 2016); Firehouse of America, LLC Franchise Agreement § 9(e), at 
16 (Mar. 28, 2016); Five Guys Enterprises, LLC Franchise Agreement § X(C)(2)(b), at 24 (Apr. 29, 
2016); Jack in the Box Inc. Franchise Agreement § 5(P), at 11 (Mar. 15, 2017); Jamba Juice Franchise 
Agreement § 12.4, at 32 (Apr. 22, 2016); Jason’s Deli Management, Inc. Franchise Agreement 
§ 15(c), at 29 (Apr. 4, 2016); Jersey Mike’s Franchise Systems, Inc., Franchise Agreement § 16.3(b), 
at 24 (Apr. 1, 2016); Krispy Kreme Donut Corporation 2016 Form of Franchise Agreement §§ 17.1 
(c)–(d), at 30–31 (2016); Long John Silver’s Franchise Agreement § 12.02(b), at 29; McDonald’s 
Franchise Agreement (Traditional) § 14, at 8 (May 1, 2016); Panera, LLC Franchise Agreement 
§ 9.07, at 16–17 (Mar. 2016); Papa John’s Franchise Agreement Standard Restaurant § 16(e), at 38; 
Qdoba Mexican Eats Franchise Agreement § 30.2.2, at 40 (Mar. 2017); Quality Is Our Recipe, LLC 
Unit Franchise Agreement § 2.05(b)(iv), at 9 (Mar. 30, 2016) [hereinafter Wendy’s Unit Franchise 
Agreement]; Sonic Franchising LLC Number 7.1 License Agreement § 6.08, at 13 (2016); Steak N 
Shake Enterprises, Inc. Unit Franchise Agreement § 12.3, at 64–65; Tim Horton’s Franchise 
Agreement (USA) § 13.05(c), at 93. 
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contracts require the franchisee to have one or more “trained” managers 
on duty at all times.91 The Jamba Juice contract asserts that the restaurant 
must always be “under the direct control of a Management Employee fully 
trained.”92 Carl’s Jr. (CJR) similarly requires that its restaurants are 
always under “the on-site supervision of . . . individuals, who must meet, 
to the satisfaction of CJR, CJR’s applicable training qualifications for 
their designated position.”93 Sometimes the contracts more vaguely 
require that a franchisee has an “adequate number,” or a sufficient 
number, of trained managers.94 This contractual language implies that the 
franchisor oversees, if not designates, what constitutes an adequate 
number of trained managers for a particular establishment. 
These contractual terms suggest that in some cases, franchisors may be 
exerting considerable influence over the working conditions of 
franchisees’ managers. A broad array of courts acknowledge the relevance 
of a company’s power over scheduling and staffing issues to employment 
                                                     
91. See, e.g., Tim Horton’s Franchise Agreement (USA) § 13.02(b), 92 (“At all times during this 
Agreement, Franchisee shall employ at least . . . one individual . . . who is responsible for the direct, 
personal supervision of the Tim Hortons Shop . . . .”). Some base it on number of shifts. See Jimmy 
John’s Franchise, LLC Franchise Agreement § 4A(1), at 17 (Apr. 20, 2016) (“At least ten (10) full 
shifts at the RESTAURANT each week must be covered in their entireties by certified managers.”). 
92. Jamba Juice Franchise Agreement § 7.2.5, at 18 (Apr. 22, 2016). 
93. Carl’s Jr. Restaurant Franchise Agreement § 10(G), at 17 (May 2016); see also Steak N Shake 
Enterprises, Inc. Unit Franchise Agreement § 1.6(B), at 8 (2016) (“The Restaurant shall be at all times 
supervised by a manager and at all times during this Agreement, all of Franchisee’s managers will 
have attended and successfully completed the prescribed manager training program . . . .”); Burger 
King Restaurant Corporate Franchise Agreement § 8.C, at 10 (Apr. 2016); Checkers Drive-In 
Restaurants, Inc. Franchise Agreement § 8.04, at 20–21 (Mar. 2016); Citadel Panda Express, Inc. 
License Agreement § 10.4A, at 18 (Apr. 2016); Culver Franchising System, Inc. Franchise Agreement 
§ 10(M), at B-15 (Mar. 29, 2016); Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC Standard Franchise Agreement 
§ 15.6, at 20 (Jan. 2013); Firehouse of America, LLC Franchise Agreement § 10.10, at 19, § 16.2, at 
30 (Mar. 28, 2016); Jersey Mike’s Franchise Systems, Inc. Franchise Agreement § 16.9, at 25 (Apr. 
1, 2016); Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC Franchise Agreement § 4A(1), at 17 (Apr. 20, 2016); Krispy 
Kreme Doughnut Corporation 2016 Form of Franchise Agreement § 4.4, at 13 (2016); Panera, LLC 
Franchise Agreement §§ 8.03, 8.06, at 12–13 (Mar. 2016); Papa John’s Franchise Agreement Single 
Location Franchise § 11(b), at 26; Papa Murphy’s International LLC Franchise Agreement 
§ 8.1(d)(iii), at 36 (Mar. 2016); Wendy’s Unit Franchise Agreement § 6.7, at 7 (Mar. 30, 2016); Tim 
Hortons Franchise Agreement (USA) § 13.02(b), at 90 (2016); Wingstop Restaurants Inc. Franchise 
Agreement for a Wingstop Restaurant § 6(a)(3)(i), at 5–6 (2016). 
94. Baskin-Robbins Franchise Agreement § 7.0.6, at 7 (Mar. 2016) (Franchisee must “[h]ire and 
maintain a sufficient number of properly trained managers . . . to render quick, competent and 
courteous service to Restaurant customers . . . .”); Bojangles’ International, LLC Franchise 
Agreement § VII.G (June 14, 2016); Dunkin’ Donuts Franchise Agreement § 7.0.6, at 7 (Mar. 30, 
2016); Jack in the Box Inc. Franchise Agreement § 5.J, at 9 (Mar. 20, 2016); Steak N Shake 
Enterprises, Inc. Unit Franchise Agreement § 1.5(C), at 7–9, § 1.6(A), at 8. 
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determinations.95 The Cordova court, for example, noted the relevancy of 
franchisor power to “supervise and set the hours of the employees.”96 
5. Franchisor’s Influence over Training of Managers 
The review of contracts suggests that franchisors exert power over 
franchisee managers through franchisor-required trainings and ongoing 
advising. As Table 1 demonstrates, all but six of the forty-four contracts 
analyzed contained a contractual term involving franchisor influence over 
the training of franchisees’ managers. Thus, franchisor involvement in the 
training and ongoing advising of managers is an area that merits further 
inquiry moving forward when making employment determinations.97 
                                                     
95. See Orozco v. Plackis, 757 F.3d 445, 450 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Orozco testified that Plackis [owner] 
did not set [plaintiff’s] work schedule . . . .”); Marshall v. Shan-An-Dan, Inc., 747 F.2d 1084, 1087 
(6th Cir. 1984) (“The franchisee, while subject to certain agreed minimum specified hours of 
operation, was free to control . . . hours . . . .”); Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-1092-
BR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51941, at *63 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2016) (“[S]upervised and controlled 
employee work schedules or conditions of employment.”); Brunner v. Liautaud, No. 14-C-5509, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46018, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2015) (“Plaintiffs have not specifically pled distinct 
facts that firmly establish [‘owners’] control over employees’ work schedules.”); Benitez v. Demco 
of Riverdale, LLC, No. 14 Civ. 7074(CM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20325, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 
2015) (“[W]hether the purported employer supervised and controlled employee work schedules or 
conditions of employment.”); Cordova v. SCCF, Inc., No. 13-CIV-5665-LTS-HP, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 97388, at *21–22 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014) (“[S. Luna has the power to] supervise and set the 
hours of the employees.”); Olvera v. Bareburger Grp. LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(referring to “schedules of the employees”); Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (“[S]upervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment.”); Reese 
v. Coastal Restoration & Cleaning Servs., No. 1:10cv36-RHW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132858, at *8 
(S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2010) (“[I]t does not supervise or control [plaintiff’s] work schedule or 
conditions of employment.”); Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. C-05-04534(RMW), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16677, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (“[P]laintiffs and Duong’s deposition testimony 
support the conclusion that Duong exclusively arranged plaintiffs’ workshifts . . . .”); Howell v. 
Chick-Fil-A, Inc., No. 92-30188-RV, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at *10 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 1993) 
(acknowledging control over work schedules as important). 
96. Cordova, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97388, at *21–22. 
97. See Orozco, 757 F.3d at 450–51 (“It is reasonable to assume that a franchisor would provide 
training . . . .”); Cordova, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97388, at *17 (“Plaintiffs allege that SCCF created 
management and operation policies and practices by providing materials for use in training store 
managers and employees . . . .”); Cano, 287 F.R.D. at 260 (“Proposed Defendants created 
management and operation policies and practices that were implemented at the defendants’ store by 
providing materials for use in training store managers and employees.”); Singh, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16677, at *11 (referring to plaintiffs’ assertion that “employees were subject to the terms and 
conditions of the training, on-going training, and satisfaction of 7-Eleven service standards”); Howell, 
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at *10 (“[Franchisee] was completely responsible for recruiting, 
interviewing, hiring, training, and terminating employees.”). 
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Thirty-eight out of forty-four contracts from 2016 explicitly required 
franchisor training of franchisees’ managers.98 The Culver’s franchisor-
franchisee contract mandates that “any new Restaurant managers” attend 
“all required training programs offered by us.”99 The Panera contract 
requires that the restaurant is always under the supervision of a manager 
or supervisor “who has completed and graduated from a certified-training 
program.”100 During the life of the contract, Popeyes requires its 
franchisees to have a minimum of three or more shift managers who have 
completed the franchisor’s training program and “reserves the right to 
test” franchisees’ managers on an annual basis.101 The wording of these 
provisions strongly suggests that the franchisor may exert a good deal of 
influence on the orientation and actions of the franchisees’ managers. 
The contractual content is not limited to initial startup trainings for 
managers. Some contracts explicitly reference franchisors’ ongoing 
advisory role in training of franchisees’ managers. The Baskin-Robbins 
2016 contract, for instance, communicates that “[w]e will advise on the 
                                                     
98. Bojangles’ International, LLC Franchise Agreement § VI.E(2), at 8 (June 14, 2016); Captain 
D’s Franchise Agreement § 11, at 10 (May 1, 2016); Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc. Franchise 
Agreement § 4.01, at 13–14 (Mar. 2016); Jason’s Deli Management, Inc. Franchise Agreement § 9(d), 
at 11 (Apr. 1, 2016); Jersey Mike’s Franchise Systems, Inc. Franchise Agreement §§ 5.1, 5.6, at 6–7 
(Apr. 1, 2016); Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC Franchise Agreement § 4A(1), at 15–21 (Apr. 20, 
2016); Long John Silver’s Franchise Agreement § 5.03, at 13–14; Moe’s Southwest Grill Franchise 
Agreement § 11.1B, at 20 (Apr. 1, 2016); Papa John’s Franchise Agreement Single Location 
Franchise § 16(d), at 37; Papa Murphy’s International LLC Franchise Agreement §§ 2.3(i), 2.4, at 5 
(Mar. 2016); Qdoba Mexican Grill Franchise Agreement § 8.2, at 11 (Mar. 2017); Wendy’s Unit 
Franchise Agreement § 6.3, at 7 (Mar. 30, 2016); Steak N Shake Enterprises, Inc. Unit Franchise 
Agreement § 1.6(B), at 8–9; Sonic Franchising LLC Number 7.1 Licensing Agreement § 6.04(c), at 
10 (2016); Taco Bell Corp. Franchise Agreement § 4.2, at 3 (Mar. 25, 2016); Zaxby’s Franchising, 
LLC License Agreement §§ III.A.6, V.E., at 18 (Apr. 2016). 
99. Citadel Panda Express, Inc. License Agreement §§ 5.1A, 5.1I, at 4, 5–6 (Apr. 2016); Culver 
Franchising System, Inc. Franchise Agreement § 10.D, at B-13 (Mar. 29, 2016); Del Taco Franchise 
Agreement § D(7), at 9–11 (2016); Firehouse of America, LLC Franchise Agreement § 4.5b, at 10, 
§ 6.1, at 12, § 16.2, at 30 (Mar. 28, 2016); Jamba Juice Franchising Agreement § 6, at 15 (Apr. 22, 
2016) (similar); Pizza Hut, Inc. Location Franchise Agreement §§ 4.1A, B, at 6 (Apr. 1, 2016).  
100. Panera, LLC Franchise Agreement § 9.07, at 16 (Mar. 2016); see also Arby’s Franchisor, LLC 
License Agreement § 6:2, at 8 (2016) (“Licensee must, at all times, employ three managers per 
Restaurant in the Licensed Business who have become certified in the Management Training Program.”); 
McDonald’s USA, LLC Franchise Agreement (Traditional) § 6, at 4 (May 1, 2016) 
(“Franchisee . . . agrees to enroll Franchisee and Franchisee’s managers, present and future, at 
Hamburger University or at such other training center as may be designated by McDonalds from time to 
time.”). For similar provisions, see Carl’s Jr Restaurant Franchise Agreement § 8.A, at 12 (May 2016). 
101. Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen Franchise Agreement § 8.02–05, at 23–24 (Mar. 2016) (“[F]ive 
(5) designated management employees . . . must complete, to Franchisor’s satisfaction, the Popeye’s 
Training Program.”); id. § 8.03, at 23 (“Throughout the term of the Franchise Agreement, Franchisee 
shall employ at the restaurant at least one Restaurant manager and three (3) or more shift managers 
who have satisfactorily completed all modules of the PTP . . . .”); id. § 8.05, at 24 (“Franchisor 
reserves the right to test any and all Popeyes Certified Managers on an annual basis . . . .”). 
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training of your managers.”102 Some of the franchisors’ training 
requirements appear targeted at top-level franchisee management, leaving 
open the possibility that sometimes supervisorial managers do not have to 
fulfill the same training requirements.103 Nonetheless, the majority of 
contracts are directed to assistant managers, or managers more 
generally.104 
Observing the situation from the contractual language alone, the 
franchisor’s advisory relationship with managers is extensive in many 
cases. This is well illustrated by the Jimmy John’s franchisor-franchisee 
contract. At one point, the contract recognizes the “substantial costs for 
the [franchisee] associated with recruiting, hiring, and training new 
management employees (including, where applicable, sending an 
employee to complete [franchisor certified training programs]).”105 
Contract findings suggest that the franchisor has some degree of power 
over managerial training at the franchise level. Influence over training is 
widely acknowledged as a key determinant of whether an employment 
relationship exists between parties. In Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc.,106 for 
instance, a federal district court dismissed a FLSA claim against a 
franchisor, in part because “no evidence indicate[d] that 7-Eleven 
exercised any control over any terms of the employment, including 
training of employees.”107 In Cordova, the court declined to dismiss a 
complaint against a franchisor, in part because the plaintiffs in that case 
alleged that the franchisor “created management and operation policies 
and practices by providing materials for use in training store managers 
and employees.”108 Essential to the ultimate determination of whether a 
                                                     
102. Baskin-Robbins Franchise Agreement § 4.0, at 5 (Mar. 2016) (“You agree to timely and 
successfully complete, and to require your management and your other Restaurant employees to 
timely and successfully complete, all training regarding Standards.”); see also id. § 2.5, at 4 (“We 
will maintain a continuing advisory relationship . . . . We will advise on the training of 
managers . . . .”). 
103. See Auntie Anne’s Franchise Agreement § 11.1, at 18 (Apr. 1, 2016); Burger King Franchise 
Agreement (Corporate) § 8A, at 9–10 (Apr. 2016); Five Guys Enterprises, LLC Franchise Agreement 
VI.E(1), at 11 (Apr. 29, 2016); Jack in the Box Inc. Franchise Agreement § 7, at 13 (Mar. 15, 2017); 
Kentucky Fried Chicken Franchise Agreement § 5.3(a), at 5; Subway Franchise Agreement, 
§ V(a)(ii), at 4 (2016); Taco Bell Corp. Franchise Agreement § 4.1, at 3 (Mar. 25, 2016); Tim Hortons 
Franchise Agreement (USA) § 13.02, at 90; Wingstop Restaurants Inc. Franchise Agreement for a 
Wingstop Restaurant § 6(a)(3), at 5 (2016). 
104. See Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. 2016 Form of Franchise Agreement § 11.1, at 22 (2016); 
Wingstop Restaurants Inc. Franchise Agreement for a Wingstop Restaurant § 6(a)(3), at 5–6. 
105. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC Franchise Agreement § 7(d), at 27–28 (Apr. 20, 2016). 
106. No. C-05-04534(RMW), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16677 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007). 
107. Id. at *11. 
108. Cordova v. SCCF, Inc., No. 13-CIV-5665-LTS-HP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97388, at *17 
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014); see also id. at *6 (franchisor involved in “developing and implementing 
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franchisee manager is an employee of the franchisor, of course, will 
depend on the specific nature of the training/advisory relationship. 
6. Franchisor’s Influence over Managers: The Questions Raised 
The contractual analysis opens up a number of areas of inquiry moving 
forward. What is the franchisor’s specific involvement in the hiring, 
firing, and job qualifications of franchisees’ managers? To what extent 
does the franchisor affect the staffing levels and scheduling of 
franchisees’ managers? What is the nature and extent of training and 
ongoing advising that the franchisor engages in with the franchisees’ 
managers? The answers to these questions will be relevant in determining 
whether a franchisor exhibits sufficient influence to give rise to 
employment liabilities and obligations. 
It could be that the franchisor’s influence over supervisorial managers 
is extensive enough to make the franchisor a joint employer of the 
franchisee’s supervisorial managers. If the franchisor is an employer of 
the manager, then it is also an employer of the manager’s employees. Even 
if a franchisee manager is not an employee of the franchisor, however, the 
franchisor may be influencing the manager in ways that affect the wages 
and working conditions of front-line employees. In other words, the 
franchisor may be controlling the franchisee managers’ control over front-
line workers, such that it could be considered a joint employer of those 
front-line workers. 
While the contracts open up these areas of inquiry, they are formal legal 
instruments that reveal little about the specific content and nature of the 
relationship. An example from the evidence presented during the NLRB’s 
recent joint employer trial against McDonald’s (franchisor) begins to 
provide additional insight. The testimony and exhibits suggested 
considerable franchisor involvement in the training and ongoing advising 
                                                     
hiring and management practices”); Olvera v. Bareburger Grp. LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201, 207 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[G]uided franchisees on ‘how to hire and train employees.’”). 
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of the franchisees’ managers.109 The nature of this advising relationship at 
times related to the work experiences of front-line workers.110 
For example, with respect to staffing and scheduling, the franchisor 
trained managers on “how to manage [the] crew.”111 The franchisor 
provided trainings to managers on how “to work with the software to 
create the schedule” for front-line workers.112 Moreover, franchisees’ 
managers regularly used a franchisor-provided checklist document to 
“ensure that the shift was set up for success with the right people in the 
right places.”113 The franchisor’s “shift management critique” would 
“help” franchisees, and their managers, “work with and train” new shift 
managers.114 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to elaborate upon all of the ways 
in which managerial intermediaries can channel franchisor influence, but 
                                                     
109. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 4063, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB 
Apr. 27, 2016) (franchisor offered mid-managers at California’s franchised stores an opportunity to 
come to an “employment practices seminar”); Transcript of Record at 20700, McDonald’s USA, LLC, 
No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB Nov. 7, 2017) (referring to franchisor trainings for franchisees’ 
managers); Transcript of Record at 10968, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB Nov. 
10, 2016) (same); Transcript of Record at 9676, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB 
Oct. 13, 2016) (same); Transcript of Record at 8886–87, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 
(NLRB Sept. 28, 2016) (same); Transcript of Record at 4055, 4150 McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-
CA-093893 (NLRB Apr. 27, 2016) (same); Transcript of Record at 3504, McDonald’s USA, LLC, 
No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB Apr. 18, 2016) (same).  
110. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 3799, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB 
Apr. 20, 2016) (referring to trainings for franchisees’ managers “on how to optimize the employment 
experience”).  
111. See Transcript of Record at 8670–71, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB 
Sept. 27, 2016); Transcript of Record at 9726–28, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 
(NLRB Oct. 13, 2016) (describing how manager should staff a shift); Transcript of Record at 9011, 
McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB Sept. 29, 2016) (describing how “shift manager 
should manage a shift”); GC Exhibit BC-496 at 18, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 
(NLRB 2017) (Franchisor representative gave shift managers and franchisee specific instructions 
including that they should “make sure the grill is staffed properly.”); Transcript of Record at 9011, 
McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB Sept. 29, 2016) (franchisor training which 
advised on how a “shift manager should manage a shift through following key success factors” 
including “focusing on service”). 
112. See Transcript of Record at 11496, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB Sept. 
29, 2016). 
113. See Transcript of Record at 4805, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB May 
31, 2016) (referring to franchisor-provided “dynamic shift positioning guide” which managers were 
encouraged to complete); GC Exhibit D-237 at 1–2, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 
(NLRB 2017) (“[C]rew schedule should be reviewed by the Restaurant Manager and Mid-Manager 
before it is posted. . . . When creating a manager schedule, copy the previous month’s 
schedule. . . . When entering managers’ shifts on ISP, edit one person for the whole month . . . .”). 
114. Transcript of Record at 9665, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB Sept. 29, 
2016) (Franchisees could utilize this to “evaluate a manager that was in training before they moved 
onto being a certified manager” as “part of their training process.”).  
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the contractual analysis undoubtedly invites new areas of inquiry in cases 
involving fast-food worker claims against franchisors. The next 
subsection draws a jurisprudential analogy from a separate industry to 
further flesh out the proposed intermediary theory of joint employment. 
B. Agricultural Analogy: Grower’s Influence over Contractor 
Intermediaries 
While the relationship between the franchisor, franchisee manager, and 
franchisee crewmember has yet to be unraveled by courts and 
administrative agencies in the franchising context, this mechanism of 
influence shares similarities with the FLSA’s joint employer law in the 
agricultural context. Indeed, the intermediary role of direct supervisors 
has long played a part in joint employer law cases involving the 
agricultural industry.115 Thus, this section draws jurisprudential analogies 
from agricultural joint employer law to further flesh out the intermediary 
theory of joint employment depicted in Figure 1. 
Many agricultural companies, commonly referred to as “growers” or 
“farmers,” use intermediaries to recruit, hire, and directly supervise front-
line agricultural workers in food harvesting and animal farming.116 Courts 
sometimes refer to these intermediaries as “farm labor contractors,” 
“supervisors,” “crew leaders,” or “middle men.”117 
Franchisee managerial intermediaries are similar to agricultural 
intermediaries, in the sense that they are the individuals who interact with 
front-line workers on a day-to-day basis. The growers are similar to 
franchisors in the sense that they engage intermediaries but are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the labor of the front-line workers. Unlike 
growers, however, franchisors have two intermediaries between them and 
                                                     
115. See Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An 
Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
187, 208 (1999) (discussing this dynamic of agricultural jurisprudence); Shirley Lung, Exploiting the 
Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
291, 330 (2003) (discussing relevant case law); Thomas J. Power, Fast Food Sweatshops: 
Franchisors as Employers Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 19 CUNY L. REV. 337, 370 (2016) 
(analogizing to the garment and agricultural contexts to argue that franchisor control over franchisees 
constitutes an employment relationship).     
116. See generally Annie Smith & Patricia Kakalec, Joint Employment in the Agricultural Sector, 
in N.Y.U. 68TH ANN. CONFERENCE LAB., WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?, 
supra note 19, at 379; Goldstein, Linder, Norton & Ruckelshaus, supra note 17, at 988. 
117. Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 236 (5th Cir. 1973) (referring to 
crew leaders); id. at 237 (referring to supervisors); Izaguirre v. Tankersley, 516 F. Supp. 755, 759 
(D. Or. 1981) (referring to middle man); Kati L. Griffith, Globalizing U.S. Employment Statutes 
Through Foreign Law Influence: Mexico’s Foreign Employer Provision and Recruited Mexican 
Workers, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 383, 423 (2008) (referring to farm labor contractors). 
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front-line workers: franchisees and franchisees’ managers. In this section, 
the Article focuses on the latter, but Part IV discusses the role of 
franchisees as intermediaries. 
In some of these agricultural cases, courts concluded that the 
growers/farmers were in fact the “employers” of the intermediaries (farm 
labor contractors). Because growers were employers of the intermediaries, 
they were also employers of everyone the intermediaries hired to do front-
line work on their behalf.118 Consistent with this theory, in Beliz v. W.H. 
McLeod & Sons Packing Co.,119 the Fifth Circuit asserted that if the farm 
labor contractor was an employee of the grower, “it would necessarily 
follow” that the farm labor contractor’s workers were also employees of 
the grower.120 Under the facts of Beliz, the farm labor contractor had little 
discretion over the activities of the workforce and the grower directed 
primary aspects of the work (such as where to pick and how to pick the 
vegetables).121 The Beliz court detailed all of the ways the grower 
influenced the contractor’s conduct.122 It likened the contractor’s role to 
“the kind” of “routine supervision” that is “commonly given by foremen” 
to communicate the lead company’s “instructions to the workers.”123 
Applying this reasoning to the franchising context, when a franchisee 
manager is essentially a “foreman” for the franchisor, there could be an 
employment relationship. Unlike franchisees and some farm labor 
contractors, franchisee managers do not have any opportunity for profit or 
loss. They are definitely employees of the franchisee, but, as the contracts 
suggest and the agricultural cases support, they might also be employees 
of the franchisor in certain circumstances. 
In other FLSA agricultural cases, courts did not view the contractor as 
an employee of the grower. In these cases, we see a way that 
intermediaries can serve as a “pass through” for franchisor influence. 
These courts concluded that there were two joint employers of the 
farmworkers, the grower and the farm labor contractor. Nonetheless, in 
                                                     
118. Acosta v. Paragon Contractors Corp., 884 F.3d 1225, 1238 (10th Cir. 2018) (concluding that 
farmer oversaw farm labor contractor to such an extent that the contractor, as well as the children the 
contractor illegally hired, were employees of the farmer); Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing 
Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1328 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that supervisory contractor was an employee of the 
grower and thus the grower was an employer of the farmworkers); Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 
192, 195 (5th Cir. 1983) (same). 
119. 765 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1985).  
120. Id. at 1327; see also Acosta, 884 F.3d at 1238; Castillo, 704 F.2d at 188 (“If [the contractor] 
was an employee of defendant, the plaintiff field workers were also defendant’s employees.”). 
121. Beliz, 765 F.2d at 1322. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1327. 
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these cases the contractor sometimes used its own independent judgment, 
and other times served as a conduit of the grower’s directions. At times, 
the level of grower power over the front-line workers via this pass-through 
method reached such an extent that the grower was an “employer” with 
FLSA responsibilities, even though the contractor also independently 
employed the front-line workforce.124 
For example, in Antenor v. D & S Farms,125 the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that the grower influenced the farmworkers via the contractor 
by doing such things as instructing the contractor about how many 
farmworkers to bring each day and by relaying complaints (via the 
contractor) about workers “not going fast enough.”126 In some cases 
applying the intermediary theory, courts have refused to find joint 
employer status because the contractor was not sufficiently playing an 
intermediary role. For example, in a separate case out of the Eleventh 
Circuit, Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms,127 the court acknowledged that 
when growers communicate orders “indirectly through the contractor” it 
shows the grower’s supervision.128 Based on the facts of that case, 
however, the Eleventh Circuit found that the defendant grower did not 
make such orders.129 
While it is very common in agricultural cases and unheard of in 
franchising cases to date, courts have examined intermediaries in other 
contexts, including those involving temporary agencies. In Baystate 
Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Herman,130 the First Circuit found the 
temporary agency to be an employer of the temp worker, even though the 
agency did no on-the-job supervision.131 The court found that the 
temporary agency “supervised” these workers via an intermediary: the 
temporary agency’s client company.132 The court stated that the temporary 
                                                     
124. See, e.g., Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 645 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that grower 
and contractor were joint employers); Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 938 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(same); Hodgson v. Okada, 472 F.2d 965, 968–69 (10th Cir. 1973) (concluding that grower was 
employer of farmworkers, but declining to make a determination of whether the contractor was an 
employee or an independent contractor of the grower because it was “irrelevant in determining 
whether the [growers were] responsible under the Act”). 
125. 88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996).  
126. Id. at 934–35; see also Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 642 (referring to “Ag-Labor” intermediary 
as receiving information about when work should happen). 
127. 20 F.3d 434 (11th Cir. 1994). 
128. Id. at 441. 
129. Id.  
130. 163 F.3d 668 (1st Cir. 1998).  
131. Id. at 675.  
132. Id. at 676.  
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agency “exercised indirect supervisory oversight of the workers through 
its communications with client companies regarding unsatisfactory 
performance.”133 
In sum, as Figure 1 illustrates, franchisor power over a franchisee’s 
front-line workers could be a byproduct of the franchisor’s influence over 
these workers’ supervisorial managers (intermediaries). It may be that the 
franchisor’s power over the manager is so extensive that the manager is 
an employee of the franchisor. Or, it may be that the franchisor’s influence 
over the managers’ working conditions is minimal, but the franchisor uses 
the managers as a portal to direct front-line workers to such an extent that 
the front-line workers are employees of the franchisor. 
Regardless of which of these two types of intermediary scenarios are at 
play, courts, scholars, advocates and administrative agencies should be 
interrogating franchisor-franchisee manager relations in the joint 
employer context. 
IV. JOINT EMPLOYMENT MOVING FORWARD 
The implications of this study call for enhanced probing of managers’ 
intermediary role, application of the theory to dependent franchisees, and 
an analytical and policy shift away from trying to separate direct from 
indirect forms of influence. 
A. Probe Managers’ Intermediary Role 
A systematic analysis of forty-four franchisor-franchisee contracts 
from leading brands in the fast-food industry exposes an underexplored 
avenue of influence—franchisor influence via franchisees’ supervisorial 
managers. Namely, the contractual analysis shows that some franchisors 
have more power over franchisees’ managers than they have over the 
franchisees’ front-line employees. It suggests that the nature of this power 
may sometimes relate to aspects of a true employment relationship such 
as hiring/firing, job qualifications, work schedules, and ongoing training. 
Once this new avenue of inquiry is considered in FLSA and NLRA 
cases, it may be that a franchisor’s influence over the managers of its 
franchisees is substantial enough to form an employment relationship 
between the franchisor and the managers in some cases. Even in cases 
where no such employment relationship exists between the franchisor and 
the manager, however, franchisors may affect front-line workers in 
relevant ways through the instructions they provide to franchisees’ 
                                                     
133. Id.  
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managers. To date, no one has thoroughly explored this potential theory 
of joint employment. 
The existing analytical concentration on franchisor relationships with 
franchisees’ front-line employees, and franchisor relationships with the 
franchisees themselves, has overlooked the role of franchisees’ 
supervisorial managers. These individuals oversee the wages and working 
conditions of franchisees’ front-line employees on a daily basis. They 
merit more intentional focus moving forward. 
Do franchisors sufficiently influence franchisees’ managers, such that 
they influence the front-line employees of franchisees? As with all good 
legal questions, of course, the final joint employer determination will 
depend on the decision-maker’s consideration of the full set of facts. It 
will also depend on the relevance of franchisor influence over workers 
necessary to maintain “brand control.” The goal of this Article is simply 
to introduce this new, important area of inquiry moving forward. 
There are compelling policy reasons for why the Goliaths of the fast-
food industry should be responsible for violations of the FLSA and the 
NLRA. A determination of joint employment based on influence via an 
intermediary is consistent with the FLSA and the NLRA’s broad purposes 
to protect employees from injustices that result from inequalities of 
bargaining power between employers and employees,134 but also with 
basic tort principles. Consistent with tort law fundamentals, holding 
franchisors responsible in such cases would effectively give the party in 
the best position to remedy a given situation the incentive to do so.135 
If the franchisor’s trainings of the franchisee’s managers include 
content leading to violations of wage-and-hour law, the franchisor (not the 
franchisee’s manager) is in the best position to remedy the situation and 
determine what care is appropriate moving forward. If the franchisor’s 
recommendations to a manager about how to handle worker organizing in 
                                                     
134. Fair Labor Standards Act § 2(a)–(b), 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)–(b) (2018) (Courts should “correct 
and as rapidly as practicable [] eliminate” the “labor conditions [that are] detrimental to the 
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary to health, efficiency, and general well-
being of workers”); National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (“Experience has 
proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain 
collectively . . . encourag[es] practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes 
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality 
of bargaining power between employers and employees.”). 
135. See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544 (7th Cir. 1987) (“This is a branch 
of tort law, designed to identify who is answerable for a wrong (and therefore, indirectly, to determine 
who must take care to prevent injuries). . . . Imposing liability on the person who does not control the 
execution of the work might induce pointless monitoring. All the details of the common law 
independent contractor doctrine having to do with the right to control the work are addressed to 
identifying the best monitor and precaution-taker.”). 
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or around the restaurant are, in actuality, requirements that lead to unfair 
labor practices under the NLRA, then the franchisor is in the best position 
to ensure compliance moving forward. In these scenarios, the franchisor 
should be, in tort parlance, “answerable for the wrong.”136 
B. Apply the Intermediary Theory to Franchisees Too 
The intermediary theory of joint employment could apply not only to 
franchisees’ managers, but also to franchisees themselves. Even if 
franchisees are in business for themselves, and are true independent 
contractors, they still may serve as critical intermediaries for franchisor 
influence over front-line workers at times. This is similar to the 
agricultural joint employer cases referenced above, where courts found 
that even when farm labor contractors were separate joint employers of 
the farmworkers, they sometimes served as intermediaries for grower 
directives.137 It is also consistent with the courts described in Section I.C 
that have focused their joint employer inquiries primarily on the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship. 
Some aspects of the forty-four contracts, along with the scholarly 
literature on franchisor-franchisee relations, suggest that courts, 
legislators, scholars, and executive branch agencies should probe further 
to consider the extent to which the franchisee is an intermediary for 
franchisor influence. If the franchisor is controlling wages and working 
conditions of front-line workers, it should not matter that it is doing so 
through a franchisee. Moreover, if a franchisor directs a franchisee to 
instruct workers about how fast to complete their tasks, or how to track 
their work time, the franchisor is exerting considerable influence over the 
working conditions of front-line workers. 
Table 2 provides additional findings from the contractual analysis that 
support the application of the intermediary theory of joint employment to 
franchisees too. It suggests several ways that franchisors may transmit 
their influence over front-line workers via the contractual controls they 
put on franchisees. There are four contractual areas that relate to the 
working conditions of front-line employees: workers’ compensation, 
employment liability insurance, unemployment insurance, and labor and 
employment law compliance. 
                                                     
136. This phrase is very common in the tort context. See Evansville & T.H.R. Co. v. McKee, 99 
Ind. 519, 522 (Ind. 1885). 
137. See Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 642 (9th Cir. 1997); Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 
F.3d 925, 935–36 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is well settled that supervision is present whether orders are 
communicated directly to the laborer or indirectly through the contractor.” (citations omitted)); supra 
Section III.B. 
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Thirty-eight out of forty-four franchisors required that franchisees 
carry workers’ compensation insurance for front-line workers. Seventeen 
required franchisees to sign up for general employment liability insurance, 
eleven required unemployment insurance, and fourteen required 
franchisees to comply with all applicable labor and employment laws.138 
These contractual terms notwithstanding, it is important to keep in mind 
that no contract included requirements related to fundamental 
employment conditions such as franchisor required wage levels or day-to-
day supervision of work. 
Nonetheless, while franchisor mandates with respect to these 
insurances and compliance measures cannot tell the whole story, they do 
touch upon front-line workers’ experiences. This is especially the case if 
there is an injury, a termination, or some other workplace-based legal 
claim involving labor and employment law protections. Moreover, as the 
Fourth Circuit put forth in Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc.,139 
contractual allocation of workers’ compensation responsibility and the 
like is relevant because it shows “codetermination or allocation of 
responsibility over functions ordinarily carried out by employers.”140 
 
Table 2: 
Franchisor Required Labor Terms  
Relating to Front-Line Workers in 2016 Contracts (n=44) 
 
Contract Terms  Number of 
Contracts 
with Term 
Franchisor Required Unemployment Insurance 11 
Franchisor Required Workers’ Compensation 38 
Franchisor Required Insurance for Employment  
Liability  
17 
Franchisor Required Labor & Employment Law 
Compliance 
14 
 
                                                     
138. The labor and employment law provisions require the franchisee to follow relevant laws 
providing front-line workers with a variety of protections. These provisions are straightforward and 
require little elaboration: Wingstop’s contract pronounces, for instance, that Wingstop franchisees 
“will comply strictly with all . . . laws . . . including those relating to . . . employment and promotion 
practices, employee wages, child and immigrant labor, disabled persons, workers’ 
compensation . . . [and] occupational safety.” Wingstop Restaurants Inc. Franchise Agreement for a 
Wingstop Restaurant § 7(C)(20), at 12 (2016). 
139. 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017).  
140. Id. at 147; see also id. at 141–42 (specifically referencing workers’ compensation). 
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Furthermore, other aspects of the contracts illustrate franchisees’ high 
level of dependence on franchisors, which may give franchisors the power 
to control many aspects of the relationship between the parties. 
Franchisees invest their own capital up front and franchisors require them 
to pay ongoing royalties to the franchisor. Contractual power may 
translate into power over franchisee’s human resource management and 
labor practices. Contracts typically give franchisors (not franchisees) 
broad power to terminate the contracts,141 to decline to renew the contract, 
or to require indemnification from the franchisee for liabilities.142 
These contractual terms, along with scholarly work showing high 
levels of franchisee dependence,143 suggest that franchisors may directly 
control independent contractor franchisees in some circumstances. Many 
franchisees may be “independent contractors,” rather than employees of 
franchisors, given their capital investments, profit-making, and the risk 
they take on. But, they are often “dependent independent contractors,”144 
and thus may serve as intermediaries for franchisor directives. 
Courts often overlook this dependency relationship between the 
franchisee and franchisor, sometimes using the franchisor’s self-serving 
formal characterizations from the contract as evidence of a lack of 
“control.”145 When dismissing a FLSA claim against a franchisor, a 
                                                     
141. For cases that considered whether the power to terminate the contract was relevant to questions 
of control, see Olvera v. Bareburger Grp. LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[Franchisor 
defendants had the right] to terminate the franchise agreement and the operations of any restaurant 
that violated the FLSA or NYLL.”); Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“Proposed Defendants had the power to stop these alleged employment violations by terminating, or 
threatening to terminate, the franchise agreements.”). 
142. See Baskin Robbins Franchise Agreement § 14.9, at 18 (Mar. 2016); Culver Franchising 
System, Inc. Franchise Agreement § 13(A), at B-17 (Mar. 30, 2016); Dairy Queen Third Party 
Participation Agreement § 10, at 5–6 (2014); Dunkin’ Donuts Franchise Agreement § 14.9, at 18 
(Mar. 30, 2016); Five Guys Enterprises, LLC Franchise Agreement § XV, at 33–34 (2016); 
McDonald’s Franchise Agreement (Traditional) § 24, at 13 (Mar. 25, 2016); Pizza Hut, Inc. Location 
Franchise Agreement § 16.4, at 20 (2016); Wendy’s Unit Franchise Agreement § 19.4, at 34 (Mar. 
30, 2016); Taco Bell Corp. Franchise Agreement § 10.1, at 6 (Mar. 25, 2016); Zaxby’s Franchising, 
LLC License Agreement § 18(B), at 50 (May 2, 2016); Bryan Arbeit, A Franchisor’s FLSA Liability 
for Its Franchisee’s Workers: Why Operational Control Over Employment Conditions Should Make 
a Franchisor a Joint Employer, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 253, 276–77 (2015) (“A franchisor can 
require franchisees to indemnify litigation and liability costs resulting from FLSA violations 
committed by the franchisee.”).  
143. See supra Section I.C and Part II. 
144. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for 
Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
251, 279 (2006) (defining “dependent independent contractors” as “those who have little 
independence or autonomy and depend on another business for their livelihood”). 
145. See, e.g., Gessele v. Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-1092-BR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
172061, at *62 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2016) (referring to contractual terms when dismissing complaint 
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district court in Northern California quoted, as relevant, the contractual 
language between the franchisor and franchisee.146 The language stated 
that, “[y]ou and we agree that this Agreement creates an arm’s-length 
business relationship and does not create any fiduciary, special or other 
similar relationship.”147 
Similarly, courts are too quickly accepting that franchisor directions to 
franchisees are mere recommendations because they are formally 
characterized as such. For instance, in Pope v. Espeseth,148 when 
dismissing the FLSA claim, a Wisconsin district court concluded that 
even though the franchisee followed franchisor instructions, the 
franchisee “did not have to follow the manual.”149 It concluded that the 
franchisor did not require that the franchisee adopt the “commission-
based method of employee compensation” that was at issue in the FLSA 
litigation.150 In Gessele v. Jack in the Box,151 an Oregon district court 
similarly characterized franchisor’s “Hiring the Right People” process and 
its “Consistent Hiring Process Guidelines” as mere “tools to which” 
franchisees “could refer” if they so choose.152 When dismissing the claim, 
the court highlighted that the franchisor-provided handbook “does not 
indicate such guidelines are mandatory.”153 
Given the contractual terms bestowing franchisors ultimate power to 
determine the fate of franchisees’ investments, and the scholarly literature 
questioning whether franchisor-franchisee contracts are truly “arms-
length” transactions, courts should further scrutinize formal 
proclamations involving front-line workers as “recommendations.” 
Moreover, in light of the fact that franchisors often evaluate their 
franchisees based on their adoption of franchisor recommendations 
related to staffing, training, or other issues relating to front-line 
                                                     
against franchisor); Reese v. Coastal Restoration & Cleaning Servs., No. 1:10cv36-RHW, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 132858, at *14 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2010) (“Reese’s position that his employment 
‘extended through’ Coastal Restoration to SERVPRO by virtue of the franchise license agreement 
between the latter, is unsupported by the record evidence.”). 
146. Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. C-05-04534 RMW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16677, at *9–10 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 8, 2007). 
147. Id.  
148. 228 F. Supp. 3d 884 (W.D. Wis. 2017). 
149. Id. at 890–91.  
150. Id. at 891.  
151. No. 3:14-CV-1092-BR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172061 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2016). 
152. Id. at *21. 
153. Id. at *25–26. 
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employees,154 franchisees may interpret recommendations as 
requirements. 
Hadfield’s illuminating work, referenced above, reveals that 
franchisors and franchisees are engaged in a “reliance relationship” 
between “unequals.”155 According to Hadfield and others, a franchisee’s 
weak position is due to its sunk costs, the franchisor’s decision-making 
authority over most aspects of the franchisee’s operations, and the 
franchisor’s ability to terminate the relationship at any time.156 The 
franchising business model is distinct from common trademark licenses. 
The franchisor instructs franchisees about how to operate the business 
almost as much it would instruct a manager at a franchisor-owned outlet. 
But, unlike a traditional “employee,” the franchisee is an owner and 
investor taking on independent risks (which looks more like an 
independent contracting relationship).157 As Hadfield notes, franchisees 
are “expected to act as if they are employed managers strictly following 
franchisor direction . . . [and] at the same time they are clearly operating 
‘their own’ businesses in the sense that, despite franchisor advice, they 
run the ultimate risk of bankruptcy or poor performance.”158 
When courts look to franchisor-franchisee relations, they should 
consider the franchisee’s dependence and potential role as a pass through 
for franchisor influence over front-line workers. While it was not a 
franchising case, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Salinas takes an 
analytical step in this direction.159 It directed lower courts to consider, 
among other things, the extent to which the two companies at issue (for 
                                                     
154. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 4764, 4776 McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 
(NLRB May 31, 2016) (referring to consideration of the number of shifts run by “a certified manager” 
who is a graduate of franchisor’s “Hamburger University”); GC Exhibit BC-1257, McDonald’s USA, 
LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB 2017) (referring to franchisor evaluation mandating that “[a]ll 
department managers . . . complete their curriculum/functional training”); GC Exhibit BC-0997, at 
12, McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 02-CA-093893 (NLRB 2017) (BSV Critical Questions include “Has 
management considered the positioning guide recommendations . . . ?,” and “Does the shift manager 
observe and proactively identify potential Danger Zones . . . ?”). 
155. Hadfield, supra note 32, at 960–63. In contractual disputes, she argues for the use of a “good 
faith” standard that asks courts to look beyond the written agreement to “examine the relationship in 
which that contract is embedded.” Id. at 984–85.  
156. See id. at 928, 932, 951, 966, 968; Elmore, Franchise Regulation, supra note 58, at 917–18. 
157. Kaufmann, Soler, Permesly & Cohen, supra note 9, at 441–42. 
158. Hadfield, supra note 32, at 960. 
159. See Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 129–30 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[J]oint 
employment exists when (1) two or more persons or entities share, agree to allocate responsibility for, 
or otherwise codetermine—formally or informally, directly or indirectly—the essential terms and 
conditions of a worker’s employment and (2) the two or more persons’ or entities’ combined influence 
over the terms and conditions of the worker’s employment render the worker an employee as opposed 
to an independent contractor.”). 
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the purposes of this Article, a franchisor and franchisee) jointly determine 
or share power over working conditions.160 
The agricultural joint employer cases cited above also support this 
notion. In some of those cases, the intermediary’s economic dependence 
aided the court’s conclusion that the grower was an “employer” of the 
farmworkers. In Castillo v. Givens,161 for example, the court affirmed that 
while the contractor “did exercise some control over the field workers, 
there was ‘no economic substance’ behind his power.”162 In Beliz, the 
court referred to the contractor’s role as “merely to communicate [the 
grower’s] instructions to workers.”163 Many franchisees, similar to farm 
labor contractors and franchisee managers, are economically dependent 
and have little power to challenge franchisor recommendations.164 
Therefore, they have little choice but to accept franchisor directives 
regarding their own employees’ job qualifications and working 
conditions. 
In sum, when considering whether a franchisor is, or should be 
considered, an employer, courts, legislators, and administrative agencies 
should keep in mind the dependency relationship between franchisors and 
franchisees. Only with full consideration of these dynamics can courts 
decide who “possesse[s] the power to control the workers in question.”165 
C. Move Away from Direct Versus Indirect Dichotomy 
The intermediary theory of joint employment calls for a move away 
from the direct versus indirect dichotomy that currently frames joint 
employer debate. The statutory language of the FLSA and the NLRA do 
not disaggregate the concepts of direct and indirect forms of influence. 
The FLSA refers to an employer as a person “acting directly or indirectly 
in the interest of an employer.”166 The NLRA contemplates that an 
                                                     
160. Id. at 142. This standard is similar to the NLRA standard before 2002. See Browning-Ferris 
Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting relevant case law as 
stating “separate business entities are joint employers if they each ‘exert significant control over the 
same employees’ in that they ‘share or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms and 
conditions of employment’”). 
161. 704 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983).  
162. Id. at 192.  
163. Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1328 (5th Cir. 1985). 
164. See generally Elmore, Franchise Regulation, supra note 58 (arguing throughout that the 
franchisee is dependent on the franchisor); Hadfield, supra note 32 (same). 
165.  Benitez v. Demco of Riverdale, LLC, No. 14 Civ. 7074(CM), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20325, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015). 
166. Fair Labor Standards Act § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2018). 
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employer “includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly 
or indirectly.”167 Influence over wages and working conditions, be it direct 
or indirect, should be relevant to the inquiry. Instead of the direct versus 
indirect frame, we should consider the extent and nature of influence that 
the franchisor has over front-line workers. 
As highlighted in the Introduction, the direct versus indirect dichotomy 
pervades recent judicial, administrative, and legislative consideration of 
the employment relationship. The NLRB’s proposed rule would require 
“direct and immediate” control over workers168—as opposed to a broader 
standard that would find an employment relationship if a company “shares 
or codetermines” terms and conditions of employment along with another 
business.169 The fate of the rule is unclear, however, because the D.C. 
Circuit in December 2018 concluded that both direct and indirect forms 
of control are relevant in the NLRA context, as long as the control “bears 
on workers’ essential terms and conditions.”170 In the FLSA arena, courts 
use different terms but frame the distinction as between “functional”171 
versus “formal” modes of influence.172 Moreover, the proposed Save 
                                                     
167. National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (“In 
determining whether any person is acting as an ‘agent’ of another person so as to make such other 
person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually 
authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.”). 
168. Airborne Freight Co., 338 N.L.R.B. 597, 597 n.1 (2002).  
169. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 186, at 7 (2015). But see Browning-Ferris 
Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (reversing in part, affirming in 
part, and remanding the NLRB decision); TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 803 (1984) (citing NLRB v. 
Browning Ferris Indus. of Pa., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123–24 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
170. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 911 F.3d at 1216. 
171. See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2003). The full set of functional 
control factors, as stated in Zheng, are:  
(1) [W]hether [the putative ER’s] premises and equipment were used for the plaintiffs’ work; 
(2) whether the Contractor Corporations had a business that could or did shift as a unit from one 
putative joint employer to another; (3) the extent to which plaintiffs performed a discrete line-
job that was integral to [the putative employer’s] process of production; (4) whether 
responsibility under the contracts could pass from one subcontractor to another without material 
changes; (5) the degree to which the Liberty Defendants or their agents supervised plaintiffs’ 
work; and (6) whether plaintiffs worked exclusively or predominantly for [the putative 
employer]. 
Id.; see also Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 141 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating that a 
joint employer “co-determine[s]— formally or informally, directly or indirectly—the essential terms 
and conditions of the worker’s employment”). 
172. See In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 
2012). The specific factors are (1) authority to hire and fire; (2) authority to set work rules and 
conditions of employment; (3) daily supervision; and (4) control over records. Id.; see also Bonnette 
v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983); Elmore, Future of Fast Food, 
supra note 58 (collecting case law in this area and stating, “[i]n contrast to this line of subcontractor 
cases, courts considering FLSA claims against franchisors often reject indirect supervision and 
nonsupervisory dependence as grounds for a joint-employer determination”).  
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Local Business Act referenced in the Introduction engages the direct 
versus indirect distinction. It calls for a new legislative standard that limits 
employment relationships to situations when a business has direct and 
immediate control over wages and working conditions.173 
This Article challenges the implied assumption embedded in the direct 
and indirect framing—that courts and administrative agencies can 
consistently disaggregate direct from indirect forms of influence, and that 
limiting employment to situations where direct control is present will lead 
to clearer and more predictable legal doctrine in this area.174 Admittedly, 
it is sometimes possible to distinguish between direct and indirect forms 
of influence. Typically, what is meant by indirect forms of influence are 
situations where it is harder to “see” the influence through formal 
instruments, even though the party is influencing actors and working 
conditions in practice. In one FLSA case involving a franchisor, for 
example, the plaintiffs alleged indirect control by contending that the 
franchisor influenced their working conditions through such things as 
“providing programs to track employees’ performance.”175 Clear 
examples of direct control include a business’s issuance of a weekly 
paystub, or a business’s engagement with a worker through other more 
formal types of paperwork, like hiring documents and employee 
records.176 Other forms of direct influence would include a franchisor 
                                                     
173. Save Local Business Act, H.R. 3441, 115th Cong. § 2(a)(B) (2017) (stating that a joint 
employer is a person who “directly, actually, and immediately, and not in a limited and routine 
manner, exercises significant control over essential terms and conditions of employment”). 
174. Many have noted that the current jurisprudence is variable and unpredictable. See Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 136 (2014) (referring to “open-ended 
balancing tests” as “yield[ing] unpredictable and at times arbitrary results”); Harper, supra note 19, 
at 46 (describing the unpredictability of multi-factored balancing tests that lack a clearly articulated 
ultimate touchstone). 
175. Cordova v. SCCF, No. 13-CIV-5665-LTS-HP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97388, at *6–7 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
176. Courts that use the formal control framework consider whether the alleged joint employer 
hired and fired, directly supervised, determined the rate and method of payment, and maintained 
records for the workers. See Bonnette, 704 F.2d 1465; In re Enter. Rent-A-Car, 683 F.3d 462; 
Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 726 (Cal. 2014) (“It is the franchisee who 
implements the operational standards on a day-to-day basis, hires and fires store employees, and 
regulates workplace behavior.”). 
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directing orders to front-line workers during inspections177 or other visits 
to the restaurant.178 
However, the intermediary theory of joint employment advanced here 
shows the limits of the direct versus indirect framing. Whether this new 
intermediary avenue represents direct or indirect influence is a difficult 
determination to make, even if only “direct” forms of control are 
relevant.179 It is undisputable that franchisees’ managers have direct 
control over front-line workers. If the franchisor directly controls the 
franchisees’ supervisorial managers and those managers directly control 
the franchisees’ front-line employees, does it not follow that the 
franchisor controls franchisees’ front-line employees? Some may see this 
as a direct chain of control, others may see it as an indirect form of control. 
Regardless of the direct or indirect distinction, this avenue would 
constitute substantial franchisor influence over front-line workers. For 
instance, if a franchisor directs a franchisee manager to direct workers 
about how fast to complete their tasks, or how to track their work time, 
the franchisor is directing the working conditions of front-line workers. 
Why should it matter if X controls Z through direct supervision, or through 
X’s control of Y who controls Z? If X controls Z, it should not matter that 
                                                     
177. See Cordova, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97388 at *6, *12 (showing potential relevance of 
franchisor supervision during inspections); Olvera v. Bareburger Grp. LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201, 206–
07 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same); Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same); Singh 
v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No C-05-04534(RMW), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16677, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 
2007) (same); Howell v. Chick-Fil-A, Inc., No. 92-30188-RV, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19030, at *9 
(N.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 1993) (“Approximately once or twice per year, Chick-Fil-A conducts a site visit to 
inspect the Cordova Mall restaurant and insure that it is, in fact, selling only regulation Chick-Fil-A 
products.”). 
178. These contractual provisions often allow the franchisor to “photograph” and “interview” 
franchisees’ employees. See, e.g., Culver Franchising System, Inc. Franchise Agreement § 10.O, at 
B-15 (Mar. 29, 2016) (“This inspection right includes our right to photograph the Restaurant premises 
and Restaurant employees at all reasonable times and to interview your employees and independent 
contractors.”); Panera, LLC Franchise Agreement § 12.01, at 22 (Mar. 2016) (stating that franchisor 
can observe or tape the operations and “interview personnel and customers”); Wingstop Restaurants 
Inc. Franchise Agreement for a Wingstop Restaurant § 7(C)(18), at 12 (2016) (“Franchisee will permit 
Company representatives to conduct unannounced QSC inspections of the Restaurant at any time 
during normal business hours . . . and to interview the Restaurant’s employees and customers.”). Papa 
Murphy’s contract states that any inspection the franchisor conducts “is not intended to exercise, and 
does not constitute, control . . . over your employees.” Papa Murphy’s Int’l LLC Franchise 
Agreement § 5.66.5, at 19 (Mar. 2016). 
179. Challenging the dichotomy along similar lines, scholars have begun to unveil the ways that 
franchisor-provided scheduling and tracking technology affects wages and working conditions. The 
work of these authors raises difficult questions about whether franchisor-required technology 
constitutes direct or indirect control over workers that is sufficient to extend liability obligations to 
the franchisor. See Charlotte Alexander & Elizabeth Tippett, The Hacking of Employment Law, 82 
MO. L. REV. 973, 974–77, 1021 (2017). 
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the control mechanism occurs via an intermediary (the franchisee 
manager). 
In sum, this Article calls for a move away from disaggregating direct 
from indirect control.180 The distinction is hard to administer and apply, 
even though sometimes it is possible to differentiate direct from indirect 
forms of control. There is a lot of analytical fuzziness in the middle. The 
manager as intermediary theory developed here serves as an example of 
the fuzziness. Sometimes the labels of direct versus indirect can get in the 
way of the ultimate employment question. Thus, any proposed “fix” to 
make a simple distinction between direct and indirect control is not a 
silver bullet that will lead to jurisprudential and administrative clarity in 
this area. 
CONCLUSION 
The “Fight for Fifteen and a Union” movement among fast-food 
workers and their allies has also become a “fight for joint employer 
liability.” The movement has spurred heightened activity in both the 
NLRA and the FLSA arenas and has raised questions about how broadly 
to interpret the concept of employment. Using a rare dataset of contracts 
between top fast-food brands and their franchisees, this Article addresses 
whether, or to what extent, fast-food brands may be legally responsible as 
joint employers. Namely, the empirical analysis of forty-four contracts 
revealed a new theory of joint employment via franchisor influence over 
franchisees’ managers. Unlike prior foci on franchisor-franchisee 
relations, and franchisor-crew member relations, this Article brings a new 
party to light: franchisees’ supervisorial managers. Jurisprudential 
analogy to the agricultural context, and the case law regarding farm labor 
contractors as grower intermediaries, supports this proposed analytical 
lens. 
The Article’s findings suggest that any fixes to the current problematic 
state of joint employer law in the fast-food industry must embrace this 
intermediary theory. Perhaps, instead of rewording statutes to narrow 
                                                     
180. Cases relating to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, like the FLSA and the NLRA, also illustrate 
the direct versus indirect control framing. Compare Evans v. McDonald’s Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 
1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (dismissing Title VII claim because “McDonald’s did not have control over 
[franchisee’s] labor relations with his franchise employees”), and Baetzel v. Home Instead 
Senior Care, 370 F. Supp. 2d 631, 641 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (dismissing Title VII claim because 
franchisee, not franchisor, was conducting daily supervision of workers), with Mays v. BNSF Ry. Co., 
974 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1177 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (referencing direct and indirect theories of control). See 
also Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 75, 112 (1984). 
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control to situations of direct control, new legislative and administrative 
initiatives could provide an identifiable analytical touchstone that could 
ground multi-factored tests and make their outcomes more predictable.181 
Drawing from Professor Michael Harper’s characterization, presented in 
The Restatement of Employment Law, perhaps joint employer decision-
makers could focus on the touchstone inquiry of whether a brand has 
power over important labor decisions with respect to franchisees’ 
employees.182 While the Restatement’s formulation, which Harper calls 
the “independent business person-entrepreneurial control test,” 
distinguishes between independent contractors and employees, it could 
serve similarly as a touchstone in the joint employer context.183 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to propose and evaluate all 
potential fixes. Whether it is Harper’s formulation, or some other, the 
Article advises that courts, executive branch agencies, and legislative 
efforts should be mindful of franchisor influence through intermediaries, 
as well as the multi-tiered and diverse relationships embedded in the 
franchise system that make disaggregating direct from indirect forms of 
influence difficult to impossible. 
 
                                                     
181. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring) (“Fifty years after the Act’s passage is too late to say that we still do not have a legal rule 
to govern these cases. My colleagues’ balancing approach is the prevailing method, which they apply 
carefully. But it is unsatisfactory both because it offers little guidance for future cases and because 
any balancing test begs questions about which aspects of ‘economic reality’ matter, and why.”). 
182. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
183. See Harper, supra note 19. 
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